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INTRODUCTION 
Nullity is the concept or the doctrine (or perhaps the most 
common doctrine) that deprives legal acts of their effects.1 In 
common law terms, it is the concept of voidness or voidability. 
Eminent authority has called this subject “one of the [most] crucial 
subjects of the law,”2 probably because of the extent of its 
application. Unlike contract law or property law, the concept of 
nullity is not specific to one series of transactions or one substantive 
area of the Civil Code. Nullity applies equally and perhaps as 
significantly in the areas of contracts, property, sales, marriages, 
community property arrangements, successions, and many others. In 
short, it applies and is relevant across all aspects of private law and 
even public law. Despite its importance, the concept of nullity has 
been noted to be one of the “most obscure in the field of the civil 
law.”3 A thorough-going analysis of nullity has eluded many well-
respected scholars, not the least of which is Domat, who it is said 
                                                                                                             
 1. See, e.g., PHILIPPE MALAURIE ET AL., LES OBLIGATIONS 333–36 (4th ed. 
2009) (discussing the distinctions between various causes of inefficacy of acts); 
ALAIN BÉNABENT, DROIT CIVIL: LES OBLIGATIONS 143–45 (9th ed. 2003). 
 2. SAÚL LITVINOFF & W. THOMAS TÊTE, LOUISIANA LEGAL TRANSACTIONS: 
THE CIVIL LAW OF JURIDICAL ACTS 162 (1969). 
 3. 1 MARCEL PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW PT. 1, No. 328, at 219 
(photo. reprint 2005) (La. State L. Inst. trans., 12th ed. 1959). See also BÉNABENT, 
supra note 1, at 145 (“La théorie des nullités est complexe et, sur bien des points, 
reste très incertaine.”). 
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“completely failed in his attempt” to explain nullities.4 Pothier, it is 
said, “did not succeed any better.”5 
This contribution attempts to add some clarity to the law of 
nullity in Louisiana. It does not attempt to prescriptively reform or 
rewrite the law of nullity. Rather, its goals are modest in attempting 
to descriptively analyze existing law in a coherent fashion and under 
a new theory. Part I of this Article briefly examines the history of 
the doctrine of nullity from Roman times to modern Louisiana law. 
In Part II, the current law of nullity is examined in a critical and 
more descriptive fashion in an attempt to spell out an aspect of the 
law of nullity commonly ignored by the traditional scheme. Part III 
critiques the current understanding of nullity and suggests that the 
categories of absolute and relative nullities are more nuanced than 
traditionally believed. Part IV posits the existence of a new category 
of nullities—mixed nullities—and offers a new model for thinking 
about nullities that moves away from the traditional dichotomous 
scheme and embraces an entire spectrum for null transactions.  
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF NULLITY 
Like so many civilian institutions, the concept of nullity in 
Louisiana law can only be fully understood by going back to the 
Romans. A proper exposition of the history of nullity requires a 
basic overview of the treatment of nullities in Roman law, as the 
basic concept of nullity in the civil law owes much to the Romans. 
Although the Romans themselves did not employ the terms 
“absolute” and “relative nullities,” they did recognize the same basic 
effects that today are prescribed for nullities of each type. 
A. Roman Law 
As many others have noted, explaining the Roman system of 
nullity is not an easy task. The Romans were not interested in 
classifying nullities but rather were interested in whether an action 
was available in a particular context or situation.6 Unfortunately, 
however, “they did not pay too much attention to a neat analysis of 
why an action could not be granted under certain circumstances and 
what further ramifications that entailed.”7 Some insight, however, 
can be gleaned. As Planiol noted: 
                                                                                                             
 4. PLANIOL, supra note 3, at 221. 
 5. Id. 
 6. REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 679 (photo. reprint 1992) (1990). 
 7. Id. 
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There were, at Roman law, two ways in which an act could 
become null. There was the civil nullity which took place 
automatically by operation of law and, besides that, there 
was the Praetorian nullity, which required that a suit be 
brought and which could become effective only by 
judgment.8 
Acts in violation of law or public policy were null. Thus, in the 
law of marriage, Modestinus wrote that “it is always necessary to 
consider not just what is lawful but also what is decent.”9 For 
example, marriage between members of certain social classes with 
divergent social statuses could be viewed, in Roman times, as null. 
Because actors in Roman times were the subjects of social prejudice 
and infamia,10 the daughter of a Senator, a member of the highest 
social rank,11 could not marry a member of this low social order. 
Thus, the Digest stated that “[i]f the daughter . . . of a senator 
marries . . . someone who was an actor, . . . the marriage will be 
void.”12  
Unlike arrangements that were void ab initio, agreements 
entered into under some vices of consent presented situations in 
which the praetor could grant relief.13 For instance, under Roman 
law, parties who entered into agreements under duress could be 
allowed relief and repudiation of the act.14 Paul, in the Edict, 
provided that “[i]f under duress I have entered upon an inheritance, . 
. . I am to have restitutio through the agency of the praetor so that 
the power of repudiation is granted to me.”15 Similarly, acts done by 
parties without capacity (at Roman law, those under 25) bear the 
indicia of the modern relative nullity, namely, that the nullity is one 
established for the protection of a vulnerable party and the act can 
be confirmed or ratified once the person reaches the age of 
majority.16 Thus, Ulpian wrote: 
                                                                                                             
 8. PLANIOL, supra note 3, at 220. 
 9. DIG. 23.2.42 (Modestinus, Formation of Marriage), in 2 THE DIGEST OF 
JUSTINIAN 662 (A. Watson, trans. & ed., 1985). 
 10. Id. DIG. 3.2.1, at 82. 
 11. JÉRÔME CARCOPINO, DAILY LIFE IN ANCIENT ROME: THE PEOPLE AND 
THE CITY AT THE HEIGHT OF THE EMPIRE 53 (1940). 
 12. 2 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 9, DIG. 23.2.42, at 662. 
 13. See id. DIG. 4.2.1, at 113 (“The praetor says: ‘I will not hold valid what 
has been done under duress.’”); id. DIG. 4.3.1, at 119 (“And in fact these are the 
words of the edict: ‘Where something is alleged to have been done with a 
malicious or fraudulent intent . . . I will grant an action.’”). 
 14. See id. DIG. 4.2.1, at 113 (“The praetor says: ‘I will not hold valid what 
has been done under duress.’”). 
 15. Id. DIG. 4.2.21, at 118. 
 16. Compare id. DIG. 4.4.1, 4.4.3, at 125, with LA. CIV. CODE art. 2031 
(2014). 
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The praetor following natural equity has issued this edict . . . 
[for] the protection of minores. For since all agree that 
persons of this age are weak and deficient[,] . . . the praetor 
has promised them relief in this edict and help against 
imposition. . . . And it is settled . . . that if anyone having 
become adult should ratify what he had done as a minor, 
restitutio is not applicable.17 
As prevalent as the concept was, however, the Roman approach 
does not provide much insight into modern day problems with the 
doctrine of nullity. The Roman concept of nullity—unlike many 
other Roman concepts, e.g., sale—was an incoherent jumble of 
concepts. Scholars have noted that the Romans used “[a]bout 30 
different terms” to describe the results of nullity.18 Part of the 
problem, which has already been hinted at above, existed because 
some nullities were decreed by the ius civile, while others were a 
result of the ius honorarium and thus developed by the praetors.19 
Some have even noted that to attempt to explain the Roman system 
of nullity, with all its terminological distinctions, in a coherent 
manner “would be an absolutely hopeless task.”20 
B. The Spread in Europe 
The medieval commentators of the ius civile did not fare much 
better. One court in South Africa appropriately noted that in 
attempting to systematize the Roman idea of nullity these scholars 
“were like blind men looking in a dark room for a black cat which 
wasn’t there.”21 Nonetheless, kernels of the Roman concept of 
nullity spread throughout Europe and became embedded in, among 
others, both early Spanish and French law.  The Siete Partidas 
evidences the distinction between acts that are null on their own and 
acts that must be declared null. For example, if a eunuch attempted 
to marry, the marriage was null for reasons of public policy.22 That 
is, even though eunuchs could consent to marriage, such a marriage 
would not be valid because “they cannot unite themselves carnally 
with their wives, so as to beget children.”23 For contractual vices of 
consent, however, rescission of the sale or annulment was available, 
                                                                                                             
 17. 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 9, DIG. 4.4.1, 4.4.3, at 125.  
 18. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 6, at 679.  
 19. Id. at 679–80. 
 20. Id. at 679. 
 21. Id. at 678. 
 22. See THE LAWS OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, partida 4, tit. II, law 6, at 457 (L. 
Moreau Lislet & Henry Carleton, trans. 1820). 
 23. Id. 
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rather than the contract being null ab initio.24 Thus, “[i]f a man buys 
or sells any thing through force or fear, the purchase or sale . . . may 
. . . be rescinded.”25 Similarly, if “any person, through fraudulent 
motives, should prevail on [another] . . . to sell [an estate, a house, a 
vineyard, or anything else] the sale may be rescinded.”26 
Early French sources also demonstrate the effects of the idea of 
nullity, but a consistent and coherent theme appears absent. In 
Domat’s famous work, The Civil Law in Its Natural Order, he 
discussed nullities, but it is difficult to find any order—natural or 
otherwise—in it.27 Despite the seeming confusion, he was careful to 
distinguish between contracts that are null in their origin and those 
that are dissolved.28 In the former category, he included not only 
things that are “contrary to good manners”29 and contracts about 
“things which cannot be bought or sold, such as things set apart to a 
holy use [and] things belonging to the public,”30 but also contracts 
made by those incapable,31 those subject to error and violence,32 and 
those without cause.33 In the latter category are contracts dissolved 
by mutual consent,34 contracts resolved by the fulfillment of some 
condition,35 and contracts annulled for fraud.36 In short, after reading 
through Domat, one is tempted to agree with Planiol that the result is 
merely a “mass of confusion.”37 
Pothier, whose work was very influential in the drafting of the 
French Civil Code, did not discuss the topic of nullity as such, but 
he did present the seeds of the modern idea of nullity in the 
discussion of the effects of various contracts.38 He seems to have 
recognized that some acts have no effect at all and are invalid ab 
initio, whereas others are merely the cause for annulling an 
otherwise existing contract.39 In the former class, Pothier discussed 
                                                                                                             
 24. See id. partida 5, tit. V, law 56, at 167. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. partida 5, tit. V, law 57, at 170. 
 27. JEAN DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER 187, 192 (William 
Strahan trans., Luther S. Cushing ed., 1850). 
 28. Id. at 192. 
 29. Id. at 188. 
 30. Id. at 190. 
 31. Id. at 188. 
 32. Id. at 190. 
 33. Id. at 191. 
 34. Id. at 192. 
 35. Id. at 193. 
 36. Id. at 194. 
 37. See PLANIOL, supra note 3, at 219. 
 38. DOMAT, supra note 27, at 193. 
 39. Id. 
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certain types of error.40 He wrote that error as to the nature of the 
transaction or as to the price that prevents the meeting of the minds 
results in no contract at all: 
[I]f one means to sell me a thing, and I mean to receive it as 
a loan or a gift, there will be in this case no sale, no loan or a 
gift. . . . If one means to sell me a thing for a certain price, 
and I mean to buy it for a less price, in all such cases there is 
no sale.41 
Similarly, errors as to the person and errors as to a substantial 
quality of the thing render the contract null.42 
In the second class, Pothier categorized both violence and fraud: 
“If the assent of one of the contracting parties has been extorted by 
violence,” the contract exists, but it is “defective.”43 “[I]t cannot be 
said, as in the case of error, that there has been absolutely no 
contract.”44 Similarly, in the case of fraud, “the contract is not 
absolutely and essentially void . . . because an assent . . . is still an 
assent” but defective and thus annullable.45 
As confusing as some of the French doctrine has been, the dual 
system of nullities from Roman law, i.e., acts null by operation of 
law and acts that must be declared null, was preserved in French 
law.46 Article 1117 of the Code Napoleon declared that “[a]n 
agreement contracted by error, violence or deceit is not void as a 
matter of law; it only gives rise to an action in nullity or 
rescission.”47 Such acts are today described as “relatively null” or 
“annullable.”48 On the other hand, article 1339 made clear that 
absolute nullity exists in certain situations, such as when a donation 
                                                                                                             
 40. Id. 
 41. ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, TREATISE ON OBLIGATIONS, CONSIDERED IN A 
MORAL AND LEGAL VIEW 14 (Martin & Ogden trans., 1802). 
 42. Id. at 15–16.  
 43. Id. at 18. 
 44. Id. at 23. 
 45. Id. 
 46. PLANIOL, supra note 3, § 335, at 224. This is not to suggest, however, that 
the Roman and French treatment of error, fraud, and duress, which produce 
nullities, was necessarily consistent. On this topic and the philosophical 
foundations underlying the Roman and French treatment of these concepts, see 
JAMES GORDLEY, PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE 57–
61, 180–90 (1991). 
 47. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1117 (Fr.). See also PLANIOL, supra note 3, § 
335, at 224. 
 48. See, e.g., MALAURIE ET AL., supra note 1, at 342; BÉNABENT, supra note 
1, at 150; Denis Talon, Contract Law, in INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 221 (G. 
Berman & E. Picard eds. 2012). 
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inter vivos is executed in the wrong form.49 Other articles of the 
French Civil Code, such as articles 181, 183, 503, and 1304, also 
suggested the preservation of the dual concept of nullities.50 
Modern scholars still recognize the dualist approach to nullities 
but explain the concept of nullities in terms of their effects. Relative 
nullities exist to protect a private interest; they can be invoked only 
by the protected party and can be confirmed.51 Absolute nullities, 
however, protect the public order, can be asserted by all interested 
parties, and cannot be confirmed.52 
 C. Louisiana Law 
1. From 1808 to 1984 
Prior to the 1984 revision to the Obligations articles of the Civil 
Code, the law of nullity in Louisiana was not clear. The law was 
marked with an absence of a cohesive regime, and rules on nullity, 
invalidity, voidness, and voidability were littered throughout the 
Code.53 Sometimes the terminology used concepts of nullity and 
voidness interchangeably, as is evidenced by article 12 of the Civil 
Code of 1870, which stated that “[w]hatever is done in 
contravention of a prohibitory law, is void, although the nullity be 
not formally directed.”54 Other times the Code left the reader to 
wonder what the consequences of nullity were and whether there 
was an absolute or relative nullity: “The sale of a thing belonging to 
                                                                                                             
 49. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1339 (Fr.). See also PLANIOL, supra note 3, § 
335, at 225. 
 50. PLANIOL, supra note 3, § 335, at 225. See also 9 P.A. FENET, RECUEIL 
COMPLET DES TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES DU CODE CIVIL 52 (1968) (discussing 
the differences between absolute and relative nullities in context of marriage at a 
legislative session in 1801). 
 51. MALAURIE ET AL., supra note 1, at 342. 
 52. Id. at 343. 
 53. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 12 (discussing voidness and nullity), 1595 
(discussing nullity and voidness), 1823 (discussing invalidity), 1827 (discussing 
voidness), 1829 (discussing voidness), 1830 (discussing voidness), 1831 
(discussing invalidity), 1832 (discussing invalidity), 1834 (discussing invalidity), 
1838 (discussing invalidity and voidness), 1841 (discussing voidness), 1842 
(discussing invalidity), 1845 (discussing invalidity), 1846 (discussing invalidity),  
1850 (discussing voidness and invalidity), 1852 (discussing voidness), 1853 
(discussing nullity), 1854 (discussing invalidity), 1855 (discussing invalidity), 
1857 (discussing invalidity), 1858 (discussing invalidity), 1859 (discussing 
invalidity), 1881 (discussing voidability), 1892 (discussing voidness), 1897 
(discussing voidness), 2447 (discussing nullity), and 2452 (discussing nullity) 
(1870). 
 54. Id. art. 12 (emphasis added). 
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another person is null . . . .”55 There were even articles that clearly 
invoked the consequences of nullity without expressly using the 
concept at all. Article 1893 stated that “[a]n obligation without a 
cause, or with a false or unlawful cause, can have no effect.”56  
The important articles on vices of consent seemed to vacillate 
and express contrary views as to whether a contract afflicted with a 
vice was “void” and “absolutely null” or “voidable” and “relatively 
null.” Articles 1841 and 1850 stated clearly that “[e]rror as to the 
nature of the contract will render it void”57 and “[c]onsent to a 
contract is void, if it be produced by violence or threats.”58 On the 
other hand, article 1881 stated the contrary position that 
“[e]ngagements made through error, violence, fraud or menace, are 
not absolutely null, but are voidable by the parties.”59 In short, the 
law contained an array of confusing principles, and commentary and 
scholarship were essential to navigating the uncertain waters of 
nullity in the prior Civil Code.60 
2. The 1984 Revision and the Classic Division of Nullities 
In the 1984 revision of the Civil Code, Louisiana adopted 
modern French theory on absolute nullities being nullities of public 
order and relative nullties being nullities of private interest. The 
1984 revision of the Louisiana law of Obligations, effective January 
1, 1985, marked a milestone change in the law of nullity in 
Louisiana.61 For the first time, the Louisiana Civil Code included 
not only specific articles on nullity but an entire Chapter of Book III 
on the topic.62  
It is currently black letter law that nullities in Louisiana law are 
of two types, absolute and relative.63 Absolute nullities are so called 
because their effect is absolute and they operate similarly with 
respect to all members of society, not just the parties to the 
                                                                                                             
 55. Id. art. 2452. 
 56. Id. art. 1893. 
 57. Id. art. 1841. 
 58. Id. art. 1850. 
 59. Id. art. 2452. 
 60. See, e.g., LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 161–90; see also ALAIN 
LEVASSEUR & DAVID GRUNING, LOUISIANA LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: A PRÉCIS 49–
53 (2d ed. 2011). 
 61. See EXPOSÉ DES MOTIFS OF THE PROJET OF TITLES III AND IV OF BOOK III 
OF THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA 70 (1983) (noting that prior to the revision 
“[t]he distinction between absolute and relative nullities ha[d] long been a source 
of confusion in Louisiana”). 
 62. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2029–2035 (2014). 
 63. Id. arts. 2030, 2031. 
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transaction.64 The purpose of this effect is obvious; because an 
absolute nullity is one that “violates a rule of public order,” it should 
have no effect with respect to anyone.65 Moreover, an absolute 
nullity, being an issue of state policy, does not prescribe.66 In other 
words, the mere passage of time cannot cure an act done in 
contravention of a law or policy of the State. Likewise, an absolute 
nullity may not be confirmed67 and “may be invoked by any person 
or may be declared by the court on its own initiative.”68 
Relative nullities, on the other hand, exist for the “protection of 
private parties, as when a party lacked capacity or did not give free 
consent at the time the contract was made.”69 These nullities are 
relative in the sense that their effects are relative only to the 
members of the transaction and, even more specifically, only 
relative to the person in whose interest it is designed to protect.70 
Consequently, a court may not declare a relative nullity on its own 
initiative.71 Because this kind of nullity is not of a “public policy” 
type, the party in whose interest the nullity is established may 
confirm the null contract.72 A relative nullity must be raised “within 
five years from the time the ground for nullity either ceased, as in 
the case of incapacity or duress, or was discovered, as in the case of 
error or fraud.”73 
Although the above discussion, taken directly from the 
Louisiana Civil Code, presents a rough picture of the basic outline 
of nullity in the Louisiana Civil Code, it does not present an accurate 
account of the current law of nullity. In addition to the defects 
underlying the theory of nullity, amendments to the Louisiana Civil 
Code and the jurisprudential gloss that has been placed on the 
concept of nullities require a more nuanced approach to nullities. 
II. THINKING ABOUT NULLITY 
To “rethink” the doctrine of nullity, as the title states, it is 
helpful and imperative to first “think” about the law of nullity, not 
just in a textualist way in which it is written into the Civil Code but 
in a textured way that embraces the multifaceted nature of law and 
                                                                                                             
 64. Id. art. 2030. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. art. 2032. 
 67. Id. art. 2030. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. art. 2031. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. art. 2032. 
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jurisprudence on the subject. The above recitation of the civil code 
articles on nullity obscures and disguises the multitude of issues 
lying beneath the surface of the written law. A detailed examination 
of nullities reveals that beneath the dichotomous characterization, 
there are unexplored issues of scope, kinds, and classifications of 
nullities. 
A. Ambit of the Law of Nullities 
Although the articles on nullity are placed in Title IV of Book 
III, which concerns Conventional Obligations or Contracts, they 
have a much broader ambit and applicability. Just as in Roman law, 
the concept of nullity in Louisiana law applies to all types of 
juridical acts, not just to contracts.74 Article 1917 of the Louisiana 
Civil Code makes that clear in stating that “[t]he rules of this title 
[i.e., Title IV] are applicable also to obligations that arise from 
sources other than contract to the extent that those rules are 
compatible with the nature of those obligations.”75 The law on 
nullity is one such example that is applicable not only to contracts 
but also to all “declarations of will contained in unilateral acts.”76 
For example, an authentic act of adoption of an adult is not a 
contract, but if done without the concurrence of the spouse of the 
adoptive parent, the act is “absolutely null.”77 In this instance, the 
consequence of an absolutely null act of adoption that lacks the 
consent of the relevant spouse is the same as the consequence would 
be if it involved a contract. 
Similarly, acts that purport to be testaments but fail to follow the 
prescribed form requirements are also examples of absolutely null 
acts outside the context of contracts. A testament, as the Civil Code 
clearly states, is not a contract but an “act” that has effect upon the 
death of the testator.78 In fact, a testament is a unilateral juridical act 
because it has only one party to the act,79 namely the testator, and is 
a “licit act intended to have legal consequences.”80 Execution of a 
                                                                                                             
 74. Id. art. 1917. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. cmt. b. 
 77. Id. art. 213. See also id. cmt. c (describing the public policy underlying 
this requirement); id. art. 1619 (stating that an act of disinherison not done 
expressly or for just cause is absolutely null). 
 78. Id. art. 1469. 
 79. Although successors are presumed to accept legacies, it would be 
theoretically incorrect to think of such an acceptance as the manifestation of the 
donee’s consent to a contract, as the operative time for acceptance is after the 
death of the testator, which is an impossibility in the contractual context. See id. 
arts. 962, 1932. 
 80. Id. art. 3483 cmt. b. 
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will in a form other than that prescribed by law results in an absolute 
nullity.81 Countless other acts are treated similarly, but the point is 
obvious; despite their placement in the Civil Code, the articles on 
nullity are not limited in their application to contracts. They apply to 
all juridical acts, including those that are unilateral. 
B. Kinds of Nullities: Express v. Tacit 
In addition to the idea that the concept of nullity applies well 
beyond the limited realm of contract law—despite its placement in 
the Civil Code—it is important to note that the general law of nullity 
applies not only to acts expressly declared null but also to acts the 
contravention of which may not specifically be designated as a 
nullity by legislation. Some actions clearly result in nullity when 
they are violated, and the Civil Code provides for such nullity 
“expressly.” For instance, agreeing that a seller is not liable for the 
eviction of a buyer when the eviction is occasioned by the seller’s 
own act is, in all cases, an absolute nullity.82 The Civil Code makes 
this clear, and no further elaboration is necessary. 
Nonetheless, other actions may result in the same consequence, 
even though legislation does not expressly so declare. In other 
words, very often a nullity may be tacit, but its effects are still felt. 
Article 7, for instance, provides that “[p]ersons may not by their 
juridical acts derogate from laws enacted for the protection of the 
public interest. Any act in derogation of such laws is an absolute 
nullity.”83 As the comments note, this provision is not new.84 
Rather, it is based on articles 11 and 12 of the Civil Code of 1870.85 
Article 12 of the 1870 Code, however, stated explicitly what is now 
implicit in article 7 of the current Civil Code—namely, that nullities 
may not themselves be evident or obvious.86 In many instances, the 
law merely prohibits a particular action or particular conduct. It does 
not state explicitly that actions in contravention of the stated laws 
are nullities. Article 12 of the 1870 Code made clear that 
“[w]hatever is done in contravention of a prohibitory law, is void, 
although the nullity be not formally directed.”87 Article 7 now 
                                                                                                             
 81. See id. art. 1573 (“The formalities prescribed for the execution of a 
testament must be observed or the testament is absolutely null.”).  
 82. Id. art. 2503. 
 83. Id. art. 7. 
 84. Id. cmt. a. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 12 (1870), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 7 (2014).  
 87. LA. CIV. CODE art. 12 (1870). Portalis proposed a provision in the 
preliminary book of the French Civil Code, which provided that “[p]rohibitory 
laws carry with them the penalty of nullity, even though this penalty be not 
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leaves that implicit by equating “laws enacted for the protection of 
the public interest” with the concept of “prohibitory laws.”88 Thus, 
the analysis should be the same in trying to ascertain whether a 
particular action is a nullity: Has the act violated a prohibitory law 
or a law established for the public interest? If so, the act is an 
absolute nullity, even if the law itself does not so formally direct it. 
Consider, for instance, murder for hire. Section 28.1 of the 
Louisiana Criminal Code defines the crime of “solicitation for 
murder” as “the intentional solicitation by one person of another to 
commit or cause to be committed a first or second degree murder.”89 
The penalty for such conduct is “imprisonment at hard labor for not 
less than five years nor more than twenty years.”90 Surely, a contract 
of murder for hire is absolutely null, even though no law states it 
and even though the law already prescribes a penalty of prison time. 
No one would be able to commit murder pursuant to a contract and, 
after being caught and convicted, legally demand payment from the 
solicitor. The prohibition of murder and, indeed, murder for hire is 
both a prohibitory law and one designed to protect the public 
interest. 
Consider, however, the case of a prohibitory law concerning a 
subject less offensive than murder, such as a law that prohibits the 
obstruction of passageways: “No person shall willfully obstruct the 
free, convenient and normal use of any public sidewalk, street, 
highway, bridge, alley, road, or other passageway . . . by impeding, 
hindering, stifling, retarding or restraining traffic or passage thereon 
or therein.”91 Question remains as to what the consequences would 
be if A agrees to pay B $100 to obstruct passage on the sidewalk. 
Would such an agreement be a violation of a prohibitory law in 
contravention of the public interest and therefore absolutely null? Or 
would the agreement itself be enforceable because there is no 
statement in any law stating that an agreement to violate this 
provision is absolutely null? Article 12 of the 1870 Code made clear 
that the law need not expressly declare such an agreement null for it 
to be so; if the law were prohibitory, then agreements in 
contravention would be null. The current Civil Code is less explicit 
                                                                                                             
 
form[all]y expressed.” PLANIOL, supra note 3, § 337, at 226 (recognizing that such 
a provision was not ultimately adopted). 
 88. LA. CIV. CODE art. 7 cmt. d (2014). 
 89. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:28.1 (2007). 
 90. Id. 
 91. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:100.1 (2012). 
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and leaves one to ponder whether the act was in derogation of a law 
protected for the public interest.92  
Some, however, have argued that when the Legislature has 
already provided for the appropriate consequence in case of a 
violation, the law ought not necessarily superimpose an additional 
concept of nullity or voidness upon the transaction.93 For instance, 
in the case of obstructing the sidewalk, the statute provides that 
“[w]hoever violates the provisions of this Section shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor . . . and shall be fined not more than five hundred 
dollars or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both fined 
and imprisoned.”94 After all, obstruction of a passage might be 
prohibited, but it is not a malum in se offense,95 such as a murder, 
but rather merely a malum prohibitum offense.96 Under this analysis, 
B might be able to collect the $100, but upon commission of the act, 
B risks losing $500, spending time in jail, or both.97 
The courts have wrestled with ascertaining the civil effects of an 
agreement to violate a law and have noted the following:  
[T]here is considerable authority for the view that, where a 
criminal statute imposes specific penalties for its violation, if 
the thing prohibited is not malum in se, unless the statute 
declared that contracts made in violation thereof shall be 
unenforceable, it is to be inferred that it was not the intention 
of the lawmakers to render such contracts unenforceable.98 
In Williston’s famous treatise on contracts, he notes that “some 
contracts, considered malum prohibitum, have been found 
enforceable as not violating the public policy underlying those 
                                                                                                             
 92. On a different, but related note, see Louisiana Civil Code article 1769, 
which states that “a suspensive condition that is unlawful . . . makes the obligation 
null.” 
 93. See, e.g., John E. Rosasco Creameries, Inc. v. Cohen, 11 N.E.2d 908, 909 
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1937) (“If the statute does not provide expressly that its violation 
will deprive the parties of their right to sue on the contract, and the denial of relief 
is wholly out of proportion to the requirements of public policy or appropriate 
individual punishment, the right to recover will not be denied.”). 
 94. § 14:100.1.  
 95. “Malum in se” is defined as a “crime or an act that is inherently immoral, 
such as murder, arson, or rape.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1045 (9th ed. 2009). 
 96. “Malum prohibitum” is defined as “[a]n act that is a crime merely because 
it is prohibited by statute, although the act itself is not necessarily immoral.” Id.  
 97.  Cf. Lusardo v. Harper, 116 N.Y.S. 2d 734 (N.Y. Ct. 1950) (holding that a 
plumber who, in violation of law, had provided professional services without having 
obtained an occupational license in the relevant area was still able to recover under 
contract for services rendered); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 600 (1932). 
 98. Fix-It-Shop v. Roy, 68 So. 2d 332, 335 (La. Ct. App. 1953) (emphasis 
added). 
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statutes.”99 Similarly, other treatises state that “[v]iolation of a 
statute that is merely malum prohibitum will not necessarily render a 
contract illegal and unenforceable.”100 One federal court has 
explained the distinction well: 
The general rule that an illegal contract is void and 
unenforceable is, however, not without exception. It is not 
universal in its application. It is qualified by the exception 
that where a contract is not evil in itself, and its invalidity is 
not denounced as a penalty by the express terms of or by 
rational implication from the language of the statute which it 
violates, and that statute prescribes other specific penalties, it 
is not the province of the courts to do so, and they will not 
thus affix an additional penalty not directed by the 
lawmaking power.101 
Louisiana, however, takes a different approach. In J.C. Yochim 
Co., Inc. v. Piper’s Estate, a Louisiana court of appeal considered 
this very issue.102 In Yochim, a wholesale liquor dealer sued the 
defendant’s heirs to recover the price due by the defendant for 
alcohol sold by the plaintiff.103 The defendant’s heirs denied liability 
on the grounds that the sales were null and in violation of the law 
because the plaintiff–dealer was not licensed to sell at retail.104 In 
fact, the law at the time imposed a fine and possible jail time for 
vendors who sold alcohol without appropriate permits and 
licenses.105 The court, however, did not hesitate to strike this 
transaction with the penalty of nullity, despite the explicit penalty 
already imposed by statute.106 The court noted, “The various sales of 
liquor . . . by plaintiff, without a retail dealer’s license, being 
prohibited by law, were void and the vender could not maintain an 
action against him or, upon his death, against his heirs who have 
accepted his succession unconditionally.”107 Notably, the Yochim 
court did not—as Williston and some other courts have done108—
eschew the civil effect of nullity from attaching to an act in 
                                                                                                             
 99. 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 19:46, 
at 545 (4th ed. 2010) (emphasis added).  
 100. 17A AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 303 (2004). 
 101. Dunlop v. Mercer, 156 F. 545, 555 (8th Cir. 1907), quoted in WILLISTON, 
supra note 99, § 19:46, at 547. 
 102. 192 So. 140 (La. Ct. App. 1939). 
 103. Id. at 140.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 141. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id.  
 108. See WILLISTON, supra note 99, § 19:46, at 533–51. 
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contravention of a prohibitory law. Rather, it forthrightly and 
unambiguously imposed the penalty of nullity, even though 
statutory law had already imposed an explicit penalty.109 
Thus, Louisiana maintains not only a concept of tacit nullities 
but also a broader one than many jurisdictions. Even though the 
above examples contained a situation involving the violation of a 
criminal law, acts in violation of civil laws that are mandatory rather 
than suppletive should be treated similarly. The law, at least 
implicitly, recognizes this fact as well. Consider, for instance, the 
issue of forced heirship, a civil law concept regulated by the 
Louisiana Civil Code that limits in certain circumstances complete 
freedom of testation.110 Article 1494 of the Civil Code explicitly 
states in prohibitory fashion that “[a] forced heir may not be 
deprived of the portion of the decedent’s estate reserved to him by 
law.”111 Article 1494 is clearly a mandatory civil law, the violation 
of which should be an absolute nullity. And, but for a statement of 
positive law to the contrary, the necessary consequence of violating 
Louisiana Civil Code article 1494 would be such a nullity. Because, 
however, a different consequence is desired, a specific Civil Code 
article exists to prevent the effect of nullity from attaching.112 
Article 1503, then, provides that “[a] donation, inter vivos or mortis 
causa, that impinges upon the legitime of a forced heir is not null 
but is merely reducible to the extent necessary to eliminate the 
impingement.”113  
C. Classification of Nullities: Bilateral and Unilateral 
Aside from merely observing that there are absolute and relative 
nullities, it is important to note that both absolute and relative 
nullities can be classified as either unilateral or bilateral in their 
effects. Relative nullities, it will be recalled, are those designed for 
the protection of a person and thus many cases (perhaps most) are 
unilateral because the prohibition being violated is designed solely 
                                                                                                             
 109. Similarly, as has been the subject of recent media attention, the violation 
of the public fraud statute should also result in the violative act being considered 
an absolute nullity. See Lee Zurik, Dirty Deeds, FOX8, http://www.fox8live 
.com/category/238094/dirtydeeds (last visited Feb. 14, 2014) [http://perma.cc 
/Q6M3-JRX7] (archived Mar. 15, 2014). That is, when a public official uses his or 
her influence in the expenditure of public funds for his or her own private gain, the 
contract redounding to the private benefit should be considered an absolute nullity. 
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 14:140(A)(2) (2011). 
 110. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1493–1497 (2014). 
 111. Id. art. 1494. 
 112. See id. art. 1503. 
 113. Id. 
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for the protection of one party.114 Thus, when a merchant contracts 
with a minor, the contract is unilaterally relatively null because only 
the minor can invoke the nullity.115 On the other hand, a contract 
may be bilaterally relatively null and allow the possibility of either 
or both parties to pursue the nullity, such as the case in which two 
minors contract with each other or when both parties to a contract 
operate under fraud or duress. Although the likelihood of this 
occurring is rare, clarity in thinking about nullities requires express 
recognition that the ability of multiple parties to invoke the nullity of 
a contract is not necessarily a hallmark of an absolute nullity. 
Importantly, however, one difference between a bilaterally relatively 
null contract and one that is absolutely null remains that the relative 
nullity may prescribe or be ratified.116 
This same observation regarding the effects of nullity is equally 
true regarding absolute nullities, which are conversely much more 
likely to be bilaterally null than unilaterally. Most absolute nullities 
fit the classic definition and are characterized as such because they 
violate rules of public order. Article 12 of the Civil Code makes this 
point indisputably clear by noting that “[p]ersons may not by their 
juridical acts derogate from laws enacted for the protection of the 
public interest. Any act in derogation of such laws is an absolute 
nullity.”117 Bilateral nullities that affect both parties to the 
transaction are very common. Article 1976 states that a contract that 
has as its object the “succession of a living person” is absolutely 
null, meaning the act is deprived of effect for both parties.118 A 
contract whose cause is unlawful insofar as “the enforcement of the 
obligation would produce a result prohibited by law or against 
public policy” is absolutely and bilaterally null.119 Thus, a promise 
to pay an unenforceable gambling debt has an unlawful cause and is 
thus an absolute nullity for both parties involved.120 Similarly, 
courts have stated that a provision in a settlement agreement that 
restricts a testator’s ability to dispose of separate property “impinges 
on her testamentary rights,” is against the public policy of the State 
of Louisiana, and is null with respect to both parties to the 
settlement.121 
                                                                                                             
 114. See id. art. 2031; supra Part I.C.2. 
 115. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 28, 1919 (2014). 
 116. See id. arts. 2031, 2032. 
 117. Id. art. 7. 
 118. Id. art. 1976. Although article 1976 states that a contract for the 
succession of a living person “may not be the object” of a contract, this is but one 
instantiation of the concept of absolute nullity. See id.; infra Part III.B.2.a.–c. 
 119. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1968 (2014). See infra Part III.B.2.a. 
 120. Mobley v. Harrel, 571 So. 2d 662 (La. Ct. App. 1990). 
 121. See, e.g., Ackel v. Ackel, 696 So. 2d 140, 143 (La. Ct. App. 1997). 
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Surprisingly, and somewhat contradictorily, there are unilateral 
absolutely null contracts too. These are contracts that are null for 
public policy reasons, cannot be confirmed, do not prescribe, and 
can be raised by anyone.122 In rare instances, however, an absolutely 
null contract may only produce the effects of the nullity for one of 
the parties to the transaction. Consider the case of the marriage 
contract. Article 94 states that a “marriage is absolutely null when 
contracted without a marriage ceremony, by procuration, or in 
violation of an impediment, such as, for instance, a same sex 
marriage or marrying in the face of an already existing marriage.”123 
That, of course, means that a marriage procured under any situation 
set forth in article 94 has no effect at all. If two same-sex individuals 
attempt to marry, have a ceremony, and lawfully give their consent 
to marry each other, nothing—legally speaking—has been done. On 
the other hand, if the impediment is that one party to an otherwise 
valid marriage is still married, i.e., one party is committing bigamy, 
article 96 states that “[a]n absolutely null marriage nevertheless 
produces civil effects in favor of a party who contracted it in good 
faith for as long as that party remains in good faith.”124 That means, 
of course, that the marriage may be only void ab initio or absolutely 
null for one party. The other party still receives all the civil benefits 
that might flow from the regime of marriage. In other words, this 
violation of public policy—this absolute nullity—renders the 
contract unenforceable but only operates (at least sometimes) 
unilaterally. 
In both instances—bilateral and unilateral absolute nullities—
the effect of a contract being absolutely null is that it does not 
exist.125 It has no effect. Although this effect can ordinarily be raised 
and observed by anyone, somewhat ironically, absolute nullities 
involving unlawful cause may be raised by anyone except, in some 
instances, the obligor to the transaction.126 That is, if the debtor who 
executed a promissory note with an unlawful cause attempts to sue 
to recover what he or she paid on an absolutely null obligation, the 
courts will often not entertain the claim.127 This limitation, however, 
                                                                                                             
 122. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2030, 2032 (2014). 
 123. Id. art. 94. 
 124. Id. art. 96. 
 125. SAÚL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 17.3, in 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE 542–43 (2d ed. 2001). 
 126. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2033 (2014). 
 127. See Boatner v. Yarborough, 12 La. Ann. 249, 251 (La. 1857) (“[J]udicial 
tribunals should not be called upon to adjust the balance of profit and loss between 
joint adventurers in iniquity. . . . The law, whose mission is to right the innocent 
and to enforce the performance of licit obligations only, leaves parties who traffic 
in forbidden things and then break faith with [each] other, to such mutual redress 
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is not a product of the law of nullity but rather a recognition of the 
unclean hands doctrine or, as is commonly stated, in pari causa 
turpitudinem potior est conditio possidentis.128 Nonetheless, this 
principle has been codified since 1984 as part of the law of nullity in 
paragraph two of article 2033, which states that “a performance 
rendered under a contract that is absolutely null because its object or 
its cause is illicit or immoral may not be recovered by a party who 
knew or should have known of the defect that makes the contract 
null.”129 For example, in Pique Severn Avenue Partnership v. 
Ballen, the court considered a claim for unjust enrichment by a 
lessor who paid real estate commissions to an out-of-state broker not 
licensed in Louisiana and thus not authorized to receive 
commissions.130 In reversing summary judgment in favor of the 
lessor, the court noted, among other things, that at that point it had 
not been determined if the lessor “knew or should have known that 
its commission contract with [the lessee’s broker] may be an 
absolute nullity.”131 
On the other hand, if the nullity is invoked before the purpose of 
the illicit contract has been achieved, performance may be 
recovered.132 As the comments to article 2033 indicate, “a party who 
has knowingly lent money to another for the purpose of gambling 
may recover the amount lent before the intended wager takes 
place.”133 In Dugas v. Dugas, the court refused to allow the 
                                                                                                             
 
as their own standard of honor may award.”); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2983 
(2014) (“The law grants no action for the payment of what has been won at 
gaming or by bet . . . .”); Id. art. 2984 (“In all cases in which the law refuses an 
action to the winner, it also refuses to suffer the loser to reclaim what he has 
voluntarily paid . . . .”).  
 128. See, e.g., art. 2033 cmt. c; see also Gravier’s Curator v. Carraby’s Executor, 
17 La. 118, 127 (1841); Mulhollan v. Voorhies, 3 Mart. (n.s.) 46 (La. 1824) (“They 
who come into the court with such unclean hands, ought to be told . . . the temple of 
justice in your country is the house of God—it should not be made a den of 
thieves.”). This idea can also be traced to Roman law. See, e.g., 1 THE DIGEST OF 
JUSTINIAN, supra note 9, DIG. 12.5.9, at 378 (“If the basis of your promise to Titus is 
evil you can defeat his action by the defense of fraud. . . . Yet, despite that, if you 
pay, you cannot recover.”). 
 129. Art. 2033. See also id. cmt. c.  
 130. 773 So. 2d 179 (La. Ct. App. 2000). 
 131. Id. at 181. See also “We the People” Paralegal Servs., L.L.C. v. Watley, 
766 So. 2d 744, 750 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (Caraway, J., dissenting) (arguing that in 
an illegal contract involving fee splitting for legal services between a law firm and 
paralegal services company, “the relatively new and untested article of our Civil 
Code [article 2033] is broad enough to stand as the specific rule of law which can 
afford relief in this instance”). 
 132. Art. 2033. 
 133. Id. cmt. e. 
682 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
application of this exception to a plaintiff who transferred property 
to his daughter to hide it from his creditors.134 When he sued for 
return of the property, his daughter refused, and the court affirmed 
her right to retain ownership because by virtue of his illicit transfer, 
he forfeited his right to have the property returned to him.135 The 
court continued by stating that the plaintiff could not avail himself 
of the exception in paragraph two of article 2033 “because he waited 
until his purpose was achieved; i.e., the danger, which his creditors 
posed, had passed, to attempt to withdraw the transfers.”136 
Moreover, there remains a second, underutilized, and little 
known exception in paragraph two of article 2033, which allows for 
performance under an absolutely null contract to be recovered in all 
cases in which “in the discretion of the court, that recovery would 
further the interest of justice.”137 Although this avenue of relief has 
been little explored, at least one court has observed its existence and 
noted that “[s]uch recovery would appear to be permissible even 
though Article 2033 also provides that a party to an absolutely null 
contract who knew or should have known of the defect, specifically 
an illicit or immoral object or cause, that makes the contract null 
may not recover a performance rendered.”138 Comment (g) to article 
2033 attempts to elucidate this element by stating that performance 
may be recovered “if denial of the recovery would leave the object 
of that performance in the hands of one whose control of it would be 
contrary to the public interest, or would render the legal situation of 
that object so uncertain as to seriously hinder its alienation.”139 An 
example of the former would presumably be the intentional and 
illicit sale of a firearm to a known felon convicted of a crime of 
violence.140 The criminal law precludes such individuals from 
possessing firearms, and the intentional and knowing transfer to 
such a person in exchange for money would be illicit and an 
absolutely null transaction.141 Nonetheless, even after performance 
has been rendered, presumably the transferor may, in the discretion 
of the court, be able to reclaim the gun and return the money 
because doing so would “further the interest of justice.”142 The last 
                                                                                                             
 134. 804 So. 2d 878, 879 (La. Ct. App. 2002). 
 135. Id. at 882.  
 136. Id.  
 137. Art. 2033. For similar language referring to the “interest of justice” in the 
Civil Code, see Louisiana Civil Code article 1848. 
 138. “We the People” Paralegal Servs., L.L.C. v. Watley, 766 So. 2d 744, 749 
(La. Ct. App. 2000).  
 139. Art. 2033 cmt. g.  
 140. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.1 (2012).  
 141. Id. § 14:95.1.1. 
 142. Art. 2033; §§ 14:95.1, :95.1.1. 
2014] RETHINKING NULLITY 683 
 
 
 
line of comment (g) to article 2033 arguably provides another 
example in which a court may allow recovery of property pursuant 
to an absolutely null contract, such as when property is delivered 
pursuant to a gambling wager to a stakeholder who was to deliver it 
to the winner but who was notified of the transferor’s claim before it 
was delivered to the winner.143 In this instance, failure to allow the 
party who gave the property to recover it would leave the 
stakeholder’s control over the property uncertain, and thus the 
stakeholder would be unable to alienate it. 
Finally, even the party who knew of the defect may still raise the 
absolute nullity of the contract as a defense. Although this idea is 
currently embodied in paragraph three of article 2033, its origins in 
Louisiana date back to the mid-19th century.144 In Hertz v. Wilder, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court allowed a defendant to allege his own 
criminality in defense of a suit on promissory notes made as “part of 
a scheme of fraud and perjury, concocted . . . for the purpose of 
screening [the defendant] from a criminal prosecution.”145 In 
explaining this exception, the Court noted that only by allowing a 
defendant to allege his own turpitude can the logical maxim “ex 
turpi causa non oritur actio”146 be given effect in light of the maxim 
“[n]emo allegans suam turpitudinem est audiendus.”147 Similarly, in 
Gil v. William & Davis, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that a 
defendant could resist payment under an illicit contingency fee 
contract by which the plaintiff was promised payment if he 
successfully petitioned the Legislature for a change in the law.148 
The exception to the clean hands doctrine, the Court noted, is 
“founded upon the necessity of the case, and the paramount interest 
of the public.”149 
D. Scope of Nullity 
Although nullities often lurk tacitly in the law, even express 
nullities may have limited scope in terms of their effects. That is, 
article 2034 makes explicit that “[n]ullity of a provision does not 
                                                                                                             
 143. Art. 2033 cmt. g. 
 144. Id.  
 145. See 10 La. Ann. 199, 201 (La. 1855). 
 146. This Latin phrase can be translated as no action arises from an immoral 
cause. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 666−67 (9th ed. 2009).  
 147. Hertz, 10 La. Ann. at 201. This maxim means that “one who invokes his 
own turpitude as grounds for a claim will not be heard.” LITVINOFF, supra note 
125, § 10.6, at 284.  
 148. 12 La. Ann. 219, 221 (La. 1857). 
 149. Id. 
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[necessarily] render the whole contract null.”150 Rather, one 
provision or clause may be annulled and the remainder of the 
contract preserved. Thus, one may willingly and freely execute a 
will but be defrauded into granting one particular legacy. In that 
case, the will is still valid, but the defective legacy is null. Similarly, 
a prenuptial agreement waiving permanent spousal support may be 
valid even though a provision in the same agreement waiving 
interim spousal support is null.151 Thus, the scope of nullity can be 
confined to a partial nullity. 
In some instances, however, when the cause of the contract is an 
illicit one, severability is not an option.152 This is often true when 
the very nature of the provision renders the whole contract null 
because it can be assumed that the contract would not be made 
without the null provision.153 For example, in Baker v. Maclay 
Properties, Co., the court invalidated an entire fee agreement 
between in-state and out-of-state real estate brokers, not merely the 
fee-splitting provision, because “the contract would not have been 
made without the null provision.”154 
Moreover, if it is evident from the “intention of the parties” that 
the contract would not have been made without the null provision, 
then again, the whole contract should be treated as null.155 For 
instance, in State v. Johnson, the court remanded a case involving an 
illicit plea bargain that preserved a right to appeal for a factual 
determination as to whether the preservation of the right to appeal 
was only a component of the agreement or “constituted a cause of 
the plea bargain.”156 
E. Effect of Nullity on Third Persons 
Although the above discussion has been confined to the effects 
of nullity between the parties, third parties who rely on contracts 
                                                                                                             
 150. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2034 (2014). Cf. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] 
[Civil Code], Jan. 22, 2002, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBl. I], as amended, § 139 
(Ger.). 
 151. Barber v. Barber, 38 So. 3d 1046 (La. Ct. App. 2010). 
 152. Art. 2034; MALAURIE ET AL., supra note 1, at 351–54; BÜRGERLICHES 
GESETZBUCH [BGB] [Civil Code], Jan. 22, 2002, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBl. I], 
as amended, § 139 (Ger.). See also Lebouef v. Liner, 396 So. 2d 376 (La. Ct. App. 
1981). For an analogous situation, see Succession of Thompson, 49 So. 651 (La. 
1909), in which the court, due to the impossibility of the donor’s cause, 
invalidated the entirety of a donation, despite article 1519’s declaration that 
unlawful conditions are severable in the context of donations.  
 153. Art. 2034.  
 154. 648 So. 2d 888, 896 (La. 1995). 
 155. Art. 2034.  
 156. 687 So. 2d 524, 526 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
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that are null must also briefly be considered. Article 2035 of the 
Louisiana Civil Code provides that “[n]ullity of a contract does not 
impair the rights acquired through an onerous contract by a third 
party in good faith.”157 This provision, the comments state, “merely 
articulates the doctrine[] of the bona fide purchase[r].”158 Although 
the Louisiana Civil Code contains only the shadows of the former 
good faith purchaser doctrine, the essence of the idea is obvious 
enough: One who acquires property by onerous contract, such as a 
sale or exchange, rather than gratuitously, such as by donation, and 
who does so honestly and reasonably believing the transferor is the 
owner is protected against other parties asserting the nullity of the 
original transfer.159 For instance, if a vendor sells property that the 
vendor acquired from a minor or pursuant to an illicit cause, the new 
vendee is protected from the effects of the nullity affecting the 
original transaction, as long as the vendee was in good faith and 
acquired the property via onerous title. 
If the contract involves immovable property, however, the 
principles of recordation apply to a third person acquiring an interest 
in the property whether by onerous or gratuitous title. In other 
words, the public records doctrine, now embodied in the articles on 
registry in the Civil Code, governs the interests of third parties 
dealing with immovable property.160 Thus, if a vendor sells 
immovable property that the vendor acquired pursuant to an illicit 
cause, the new vendee is protected from the effects of the nullity 
affecting the original transaction, provided the vendee acquired the 
property in the absence of a recorded document evidencing the 
claims of a third party.161 
III. CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT DOCTRINE AND REFINEMENT OF THE 
CLASSIC DIVISION 
Although the above clarifications have elucidated some doctrinal 
distinctions that usually operate sub silentio, nothing has yet been 
said to gainsay the traditional definitions that relative nullities 
operate to protect private interests and absolute nullities to protect 
                                                                                                             
 157. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2035 (2014). 
 158. Id. cmt. a. 
 159. LA. CIV. CODE art. 520 (1980) (repealed 1981). For background on the 
repeal of the good faith purchaser doctrine in Louisiana, see Tanya Ann Ibieta, 
Comment, The Transfer of Ownership of Movables, 47 LA. L. REV. 841 (1987). 
The remaining vestiges of the good faith purchaser doctrine are embodied in a 
series of disconnected articles. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 521–525, 1565, 1856, 
2035 (2014). 
 160. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3338–3353 (2014). 
 161. Id. arts. 3338, 3342. 
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public ones. This Section takes up that challenge and critically 
examines the defining distinctions between the nullities. In doing so, 
it proceeds in two parts, first dispelling some myths and concluding 
what nullity is not about and then more specifically discussing what 
nullity is about. 
A. What Nullity Is Not About 
Before attempting to classify and define the various types of 
nullities, consideration of what nullity is not about is necessary. As 
discussed below, nullity is neither about the severity or significance 
of the violation of law nor the scope of the interest being protected 
by the nullity. The understanding of the contours of nullity is 
considered in Subsection B. 
1. Not Severity or Significance of Violation 
When one considers the definitions of nullities—i.e., an absolute 
nullity violates a rule of public order and a relative nullity only 
violates a rule established for the protection of a private person— 
there is a tendency to think that an absolute nullity is something 
more serious than a relative nullity. Although no one seriously posits 
this as the criteria for distinction or basis, the thought often persists 
in the sort of common intellectual culture in Louisiana. For example, 
eminent authority has written that 
acts which are contrary to the rules pertaining to the 
organization of the state and the nation are . . . absolutely 
null. This would be the case of private dealings entered into 
with the enemy in times of war . . . .162 
Relative nullities, on the other hand, are often thought of as 
more private and less serious than wrongs dealing with the enemy in 
times of war. Thus, the Civil Code article on relative nullities 
provides the paradigmatic example of a relative nullity: “when a 
party lacked capacity or did not give free consent at the time the 
contract was made.”163 
The very terms “absolute” or “radical” nullity and the concept of 
violating “public policy” or “public order” seem to suggest an 
egregious wrong, as opposed to the lesser implications of a relative 
nullity or something in the private interest. The jurisprudence also 
reinforces the idea—at least sometimes—that absolute nullities are 
more severe than relative ones. For example, an agreement between 
                                                                                                             
 162. LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 170. 
 163. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2031 (2014). 
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two candidates for sheriff that the winner would name the loser as 
deputy sheriff and pay him half the salary of the office violates 
public policy and is unenforceable.164 Whereas a contract has been 
held to be relatively null where an agent for a property owner lacked 
the technical authority to sign an option to purchase, but the 
property owner subsequently ratified it.165 
As the French scholars, the Mazeauds, have pointed out, it is 
incorrect to think of absolute nullities as more offensive than 
relative ones.166 Absolute and relative nullities have nothing to do 
with the severity of the legal violation, and in many ways, their 
effects are identical.167 Two examples make this very clear. 
Consider the example of two friends playing cards when one runs 
out of money and the first friend lends money to the second so that 
the game may continue.168 The second friend signs a promissory 
note evidencing the indebtedness and loses the money, and then the 
first eventually tries to collect. The first friend will be precluded 
from enforcing the promise of the second because the contract has 
an illicit or immoral cause and is thus an absolute nullity.169 On the 
other hand, if the first friend threatens to kill the second at gunpoint 
unless he loans the money, this loan is only relatively null because 
the contract was confected under duress.170 Clearly, the second 
example, the one involving only the relative nullity, is more severe 
and more offensive than the first, but in only the first example is the 
nullity an absolute one. 
2. Not the Scope of the Interest Protected 
Most French and Louisianan authors, though, would 
undoubtedly agree with the above and argue that the true distinction 
between the nullities is whose interest is being protected by the 
nullity and thus who can raise it.171 This is certainly a distinction 
that can be employed in standard cases. For example, most nullities 
                                                                                                             
 164. Glover v. Taylor, 38 La. Ann. 634 (La. 1886). 
 165. Bradstreet v. Kinchen, 10 So. 3d 331 (La. Ct. App. 2009). 
 166. MAZEAUD ET AL., OBLIGATIONS: THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE 292 (8th ed. 1991). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2983 (2014); see also Lamy v. Will, 140 So. 
2d 794 (La. Ct. App. 1962); Lauer v. Catalanotto, 522 So. 2d 656 (La. Ct. App. 
1988). But see TeleRecovery of La., Inc. v. Major, 734 So. 2d 947 (La. Ct. App. 
1999); Players Lake Charles, LLC v. Tribble, 779 So. 2d 1058 (La. Ct. App. 
2001). 
 169. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2030 (2014). 
 170. See, e.g., id. arts. 1959–1964.  
 171. MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 166, at 292 (explaining the French view: 
“La différence essentielle entre les nullités absolues et relatives tient au nombre 
des personnes qui se trouvent protégées et peuvent exercer l'action”). 
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of the relative type fit the basic definition of the Code and thus are 
established for the “protection of private parties.”172 The Code itself 
provides a number of examples of this type of nullity, such as “when 
a party lacked capacity or did not give free consent at the time the 
contract was made.”173 Most nullities of the absolute kind, on the 
other hand, are violative of rules of public order, such as when the 
object of a contract is illegal.174  
As a matter of positive law, the above statements are 
incontrovertible. Unfortunately, they are also relatively unhelpful, as 
stating that an act is null for public policy reasons or for reasons of 
private protection is only really helpful, as some French scholars 
have noted, when there is already a settled rule establishing what 
kind of nullity exists.175 The above distinctions are good post-hoc 
explanations but provide little guidance to lawyers, judges, and 
scholars in need of a system to discern the character of a nullity 
when the law does not otherwise prescribe. 
Consider, for example, article 2447, which states that “[o]fficers 
of a court, such as judges, attorneys, clerks, and law enforcement 
agents, cannot purchase litigious rights under contestation in the 
jurisdiction of that court.”176 In fact, the article states plainly that 
“[t]he purchase of a litigious right by such an officer is null and 
makes the purchaser liable for all costs, interest, and damages.”177 
The article does not, however, define what type of nullity is at issue. 
On the one hand, this rule appears to strike “officers of the court” 
with an incapacity to hold or enjoy this right, not an incapacity to 
exercise a right, such as one that affects a minor who needs help to 
enter a contract. Prior law imposed such absolute incapacities to 
hold or enjoy rights on doctors who tended the sick during their last 
illness and thus suffered an absolute incapacity to receive a donation 
from them.178 The basis for the nullity of article 2447 could easily 
be seen as protection of the integrity of the courts and the 
impartiality of the administration of justice. Thus, it is 
understandable why modern cases have characterized this nullity as 
absolute.179 
                                                                                                             
 172. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2031 (2014). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. art. 2030. 
 175. BARRY NICHOLAS, THE FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 79 (2d ed. 1992). 
 176. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2447 (2014). 
 177. Id. 
 178. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1489 (1870).  
 179.  See D’Albora v. Roussel, 182 So. 2d 124, 129 (La. Ct. App. 1966) (stating 
that the court believed the nullity was absolute). 
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Older cases, however, held to the contrary and concluded that 
the nullity involved in this context is a relative one.180 French 
jurisprudence and commentary are in accord with regard to the 
corresponding article 1596 of the Code Napoleon in concluding the 
nullity involved in this instance is relative, not absolute.181 In 
support of this conclusion, one could easily find a private, rather 
than public, purpose embodied in this article. Some French authors 
have concluded that “one could accuse the enumerated persons of 
having taken advantage of their positions to acquire the litigious 
rights very cheaply.”182 Similarly, at the time of the presentation of 
the French Civil Code to the Corps Legislative, it was stated that the 
prohibition was established for “the safeguard of the litigants” as 
well as “a necessary consequence of religious principles which 
safeguard the sanctity of their ministry.”183 
In short, the line between private and public interest is not 
always obvious.184 Unfortunately, Louisiana law is replete with 
examples in which the law declares an act “null” without further 
refining the type of nullity involved.185 When the law does not make 
clear the type of nullity that exists, the parties, courts, and scholars 
must assess the content of the nullity based upon the characteristics 
and definitions of the nullities. Thus, a clear distinction between the 
types of nullities becomes imperative. 
B. What Nullity Is About: Temporary v. Permanent Defects 
If the basis of nullity is not about the seriousness of the violation 
or whose interest is being protected, the true nature of nullity must 
be examined. Although typically considered an effect of a nullity, a 
helpful criterion in distinguishing between absolute and relative 
nullities is the permanency of the defect or problem. 
1. Temporary Defects: Relative Nullities 
Just as with absolute nullities, most relative nullities fit the basic 
definition of the Code and thus are established for the “protection of 
                                                                                                             
 180. Lane v. Cameron, 36 La. Ann. 773, 778 (La. 1844); New Orleans 
Gaslight Co. v. Webb, 7 La. Ann. 168, 168 (La. 1852). 
 181. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1596 (2014); 2 COLIN & CAPITANT, COURS 
ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 24 (Ctr. of Civil Law Studies trans., 8th 
ed. 1935). But see Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 
3e civ., May 15, 1991, Bull. civ. III, No. 140 (Fr.). 
 182. COLIN & CAPITANT, supra note 181, at 24. 
 183. 14 FENET, supra note 50, at 117 (author translation). 
 184. MALAURIE ET AL., supra note 1, at 345. 
 185. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1529−1531, 1619, 1733, 3123, 3471 (2014). 
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private parties.”186 The Code itself provides a number of examples 
of this type of nullity, such as “when a party lacked capacity or did 
not give free consent at the time the contract was made.”187 The 
typical cases of nullity are clearly identified in the Code. Lack of 
free consent, such as when a party was under duress in contracting, 
is a relative nullity.188 Thus, the nullity is established not for public 
policy reasons but as a protective device for the party in whom fear 
of “unjust and considerable injury” has been instilled.189 The nullity 
of such a contract, then, can only be raised by the party against 
whom the duress was directed, and such party can, if he or she 
desires, confirm the contract after the duress has ceased.190 Finally, a 
contract entered into under duress is subject to a five-year 
prescriptive period, which commences on the date on which the 
duress ceases.191  
Relative nullities, of course, exist in a multitude of other cases, 
such as when an unemancipated minor enters into a contract.192 In 
such as case, the unemancipated minor suffers from an incapacity to 
exercise certain rights, despite the ability to hold those rights, and 
thus needs the assistance of a parent or tutor to fully exercise 
them.193 Once again, this nullity is established not for reasons of 
state public policy but for the protection of the minor. Thus, if the 
unemancipated minor enters into a contract, despite incapacity, he or 
she may have the contract annulled.194 The contract, being a relative 
nullity, however, “may be rescinded only at the request of [the 
unemancipated minor] or his legal representative.”195 It may, of 
course, be confirmed by the unemancipated minor or a legal 
representative once the minor acquires capacity.196 The minor’s 
ability to raise this nullity prescribes five years from the date on 
which the incapacity ceases.197  
                                                                                                             
 186. Id. art. 2031.  
 187. Id. 
 188. Id.; id. art. 1959. 
 189. Id. art. 1959.  
 190. Id. art. 2031. 
 191. Id. art. 2032. 
 192. Id. art. 1919 (“A contract made by a person without legal capacity is 
relatively null . . . .”). 
 193. Incapacities to enjoy or hold certain rights are to be distinguished from 
incapacities to exercise, which allow individuals to hold rights but not exercise 
them without assistance of another, such as a tutor or curator. For more on the 
distinction, see LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 58–104; MAZEAUD ET AL., 
supra note 166, at 285. 
 194. Art. 1919. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. art. 1920. 
 197. Id. art. 2032.  
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The important feature of relative nullities, as opposed to absolute 
ones, however, is not who is protected by the nullity but whether the 
nullity is temporary so that once the offending element ceases, the 
parties can redo the contract such that it has retroactive effect to 
when the contract was first executed. In other words, the parties can 
confirm it.198 Consider contracts involving an incapacity or under 
fraud, duress, or error. If an actor is under the age of 16 and makes a 
contract, the contract is relatively null.199 The relative nullity is 
obvious because once the minor becomes 18, the offending element 
of the contract disappears and the contract can be ratified such that it 
has effect and has had effect since the minor was 16.200 This is not 
an entirely different test from public versus private interest, but it 
does provide a more effective way to discriminate among the 
different null transactions that exist in the law. In addition to the 
incapacity of minority ceasing when a party reaches majority, so too 
does a nullity affecting transactions entered into under fraud or 
duress. Once the fraud or duress ceases, the transactions can be 
pursued and executed in free and fully effective form. 
2. Permanent Defects: Absolute Nullities 
Although the category of absolute nullity is a necessary one, it is 
not entirely accurate to characterize, as the Civil Code does, all 
absolute nullities as those that “violate a rule of public order.”201 
Just as with relative nullities, the important element of absolute ones 
is that the defect or invalidity is permanent insofar as the offending 
transaction cannot be fixed in a way that gives it effect. The 
transaction must simply be redone without the offending element. 
Acts that violate “public order” are only one subset of defective acts 
that suffer from a permanent defect and thus only one subset of 
absolute nullity. Other types of absolute nullities also exist, namely, 
those that arise due to a failure to follow certain form requirements 
or the prerequisites required for the formation of particular juridical 
acts.   
a. Public Order Nullities 
Most absolute nullities do fit the classic definition and are 
characterized as such because they are rules of public order. Article 
12 of the Civil Code makes this point indisputably: “Persons may 
                                                                                                             
 198. See id. art. 2031. 
 199. See id. arts. 29, 1919. 
 200. See id. art. 2031.  
 201. Id. art. 2030. 
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not by their juridical acts derogate from laws enacted for the 
protection of the public interest. Any act in derogation of such laws 
is an absolute nullity.”202 
For example, a contract that has as its object the “succession of a 
living person” is absolutely null,203 as would be a contract for illicit 
drugs. In both cases, the object of the contract is illegal, as is the 
cause.204 And a contract with unlawful cause would clearly be an 
absolute nullity, as the Civil Code states that a “cause . . . is 
unlawful when the enforcement of the obligation would produce a 
result prohibited by law or against public policy.”205 A promissory 
note given as evidence of money owed on unlawful gambling debts 
contains an unlawful cause and is thus an absolute nullity.206 
Similarly, courts have stated that a provision in a settlement 
agreement that restricts a testator’s ability to dispose of separate 
property “impinges on her testamentary rights, and her legal 
usufruct of [her husband]” and is against the public policy of the 
State of Louisiana.207 In all of the above cases—sales of succession 
rights, illicit drugs, and gambling debts—the defects are permanent. 
The contracts cannot be fixed or confirmed. 
Numerous cases exist, of course, outside the contracts context. 
In the realm of successions, prohibited substitutions are absolute 
nullities.208 Prohibited substitutions are “dispositions by which a 
thing is donated in full ownership to a first donee, called the 
institute, with a charge to preserve the thing and deliver it to a 
second donee, called the substitute, at the death of the institute.”209 
This rule attempts to limit dead-hand control and keep property in 
commerce and thus serves one of the same purposes as the common 
law rule against perpetuities.210 Therefore, it is considered a matter 
of public policy, the violation of which is an absolute nullity.211 
Similarly, actors suffer from incapacities to enjoy certain rights,212 
such as the ability to marry a person of the same sex, which results 
                                                                                                             
 202. Id. art. 7. 
 203. Id. art. 1976. 
 204. See id. art 1968. 
 205. Id.  
 206. Mobley v. Harrel, 571 So. 2d 662 (La. Ct. App. 1990).  
 207. Ackel v. Ackel, 696 So. 2d 140, 143 (La. Ct. App. 1997). 
 208. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1520 (2014). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Prohibited Substitutions: Louisiana’s Experience 
with a French Institution, 48 LOY. L. REV. 715, 747−51 (2002). 
 211. Id. at 735−39. 
 212. Incapacities to enjoy or hold certain rights are to be distinguished from 
incapacities to exercise, which allow individuals to hold rights but not exercise 
them without assistance of another, such as a tutor or curator. For more on the 
distinction, see LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 2, at 58–104. 
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in an absolute nullity because the rule prescribed is one of public 
policy.213 Here, the Code is clear that “[p]ersons of the same sex 
may not contract marriage with each other” and “a purported 
marriage contracted in contravention of . . . article [89] is an 
absolute nullity.”214 All of the above instances are examples of 
juridical acts that are against public policy, permanently defective, 
and absolutely null.  
b. Violation of Solemn Form Requirements 
Another subclass of absolute nullity exists that, although 
demonstrating the characteristics of an absolute nullity (i.e., it 
produces no effect, is not subject to prescription, and can be raised 
by anyone), does not meet the general definitional requirement in 
the Civil Code of “violat[ing] a rule of public order.”215 This second 
subclass involves certain acts that derogate from solemnly 
prescribed form requirements and can be better explained by 
considering the permanency of the kind of defect it creates.216 
Form requirements can have many purposes. Some requirements 
of form exist for cautionary reasons; others for evidentiary reasons. 
Solemnities in juridical acts exist for the cautionary reason, and the 
violation of solemn form requirements is an absolute nullity.217 The 
reason is not clear at first. Solemn form requirements exist to 
communicate the seriousness and solemnity of the act being entered 
into. In other words, solemnities exist to allow a party to consider 
deliberatively the consequences of the act and change his or her 
mind before doing so. As Professor Litvinoff stated: 
In some instances the formality of a writing is required by 
the law ad solemnitatem, that is, as a solemnity without 
which an act cannot have any effect and cannot therefore 
give rise to any obligation. There is a good policy reason for 
this turning of a formality into a solemnity whenever a 
person, through the process of executing the formality, must 
be given a chance of becoming clearly aware of the 
                                                                                                             
 213. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 89 (2014). 
 214. Id. art. 89; id. cmt. b. 
 215. Id. art. 2030. 
 216. French doctrine is in accord. See, e.g., BÉNABENT, supra note 1, at 151. 
 217. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1573 (2014); see also BÜRGERLICHES 
GESETZBUCH [BGB] [Civil Code], Jan. 22, 2002, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBl. I], 
as amended, § 125 (Ger.) (noting that legal transaction is void for lack of 
compliance with form requirements.); BASIL MARKESINIS ET AL., THE GERMAN 
LAW OF CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE TREATISE 84 (2d ed. 2006) (“Where form is 
required, its absence will typically make the transaction void . . . .”). 
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consequences of the intended act. In such cases, the 
formality may be said to perform a cautionary function.218 
The classic case of solemn form requirements is the form 
required for wills—the form requirements could not be more 
essential and do not exist primarily for evidentiary reasons but for 
cautionary ones. A testator cannot make an oral will or a videotaped 
will.219 A testator has the option to execute either a notarial will or 
an olographic one.220 Article 1573 unequivocally states that “[t]he 
formalities prescribed for the execution of a testament must be 
observed or the testament is absolutely null.”221 Because the purpose 
is cautionary, it is more protective of the testator than of society and 
thus is hard to characterize as a matter of public order. That being 
said, because the form is a solemn one and solemn form 
requirements are “of the essence” for wills, violation of the form 
requirements results in a permanent defect that produces an absolute 
nullity.  
Another important example exists in the case of marriage. For a 
marriage to be valid, a “marriage ceremony” must occur.222 The 
purpose of the ceremony is a cautionary one to allow the parties to 
appreciate the significance of the commitment being undertaken.223 
In fact, prior to the revision of the marriage articles in 1987, the 
Code of 1870, rather than using the term “marriage ceremony,” 
required that the marriage contract be entered into “pursuant to the 
forms and solemnities prescribed by law”—clearly indicating the 
purpose of the ceremony is predominantly a cautionary one rather 
than an evidentiary formality.224 With the above in mind, it is 
                                                                                                             
 218. LITVINOFF, supra note 125, § 12.12, at 294. 
 219. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1570, 1574–1576 (2014). 
 220. Id. arts. 1570, 1574. 
 221. Id. art. 1573 (emphasis added). 
 222. Id. art. 87 (“The requirements for the contract of marriage are . . . [a] 
marriage ceremony.”). 
 223. This cautionary function is furthered by the 72-hour waiting period that 
must elapse between issuance of a marriage license and performance of the 
ceremony. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:241 (2008). Note, however, that the violation 
of the waiting period does not annul the marriage but merely subjects the officiant 
to a penalty. Id. § 9:243. 
 224. LA. CIV. CODE art. 90 (1870). Although the requirement of “two 
competent witnesses of full age” seems to suggest the ceremony also has an 
evidentiary function, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:244 (2008), the courts have stated 
that the requirement of witnesses is “merely directory to the celebrant, and that the 
failure to technically observe these formalities does not strike the marriage with 
nullity.” Parker v. Saileau, 213 So. 2d 190 (La. Ct. App. 1968); Tennison v. 
Nevels, 965 So. 2d 425 (La. Ct. App. 2007).  
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obvious why the Civil Code declares that “[a] marriage is absolutely 
null when contracted without a marriage ceremony.”225  
Not every form requirement, however, produces an absolute 
nullity upon its violation. Unlike the cautionary or solemn form 
requirements discussed above, some form requirements exist not to 
communicate the seriousness or solemnity of the transaction but to 
avoid contestations of proof and disputes as to the actual occurrence 
of an event. Noncompliance with these formalities should not be 
null as a matter of law if other equally reliable evidence exists to 
support the existence of the transaction. 
For example, article 1839 of the Civil Code requires that the 
transfer of immovable property be made “by authentic act or by act 
under private signature.”226 However, a transfer of immovable 
property made in any other way, e.g., by oral contract, is not 
necessarily null. The reason why such a transfer would not be 
absolutely null is because if delivery has occurred, the sale will be 
valid despite the absence of the requisite formalities if “the 
transferor recognizes the transfer when interrogated on oath.”227 
Thus, in this case, the formalities of a writing under private 
signature or an authentic act are not solemnities that exist for 
cautionary reasons but are rather evidentiary requirements to ensure 
that an actual transfer took place. Consequently, when equally 
reliable evidence exists, the transaction is valid and not subject to 
nullification. 
Similarly, article 3072 requires that “[a] compromise shall be 
made in writing.”228 Just as above, however, failure to execute a 
compromise in writing does not necessarily result in a nullity, 
provided that equally reliable evidence exists.229 Appropriately, 
then, article 3072 provides that a compromise may still be valid if it 
is “recited in open court, in which case the recitation shall be 
susceptible of being transcribed from the record of the 
proceedings.”230 
Furthermore, in addition to requiring a ceremony for a valid 
marriage, Louisiana law requires the presence and signature of “two 
competent witnesses of full age.”231 The requirement of witnesses 
exists not for cautionary purposes but for evidentiary ones. As such, 
their absence does not result in the absolute nullity of the 
                                                                                                             
 225. LA. CIV. CODE art. 94 (2014). Similarly, Louisiana Civil Code article 
3038 states that “suretyship must be express and in writing.” Id. art. 3038.  
 226. Id. art. 1839. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. art. 3072. 
 229. See id.  
 230. Id.  
 231. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:244 (2008). 
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marriage.232 Rather, this form requirement is treated as merely 
“directory to the celebrant,” and the failure to observe it does not 
invalidate the marriage.233 
Once again, Professor Litvinoff explained as follows:  
In other instances the formality of a writing is required by 
the law ad probationem, that is, for evidentiary purposes, in 
which case the juridical act may produce effects even when 
the formality has been omitted, although subject to the 
uncertainty of securing proof other than witnesses or 
presumptions. That is why such a formality is evidentiary 
rather than cautionary. Such is the case of an orally-made 
sale of immovable property, for example, which is valid 
between the parties when the property has been actually 
delivered and the transferor recognizes the transfer when 
interrogated on oath. In addition to the written formality, the 
law may sometimes require that the writing must be 
approved by the court or an administrative law judge. Such 
is true with compromise agreements in workers’ 
compensation cases and community property partitions.234 
In conclusion, although the requirements of formalities for 
certain transactions may be incorporated into the basic law of 
nullity, the general description of absolute nullities as “public 
policy” nullities and relative nullities as those established for the 
protection of private parties does not explain the importance of form 
requirements and the consequences of noncompliance. In fact, use 
of the traditional explanation of nullities may lead one astray in 
thinking about formalities. After all, cautionary formalities, or those 
that provide for certain solemnities in transactions, appear to exist 
for the protection of parties, i.e., to ensure that a party in fact wants 
to go forward with the transaction, but these types of defects result 
not in relative nullities but in absolute ones. 
c. The Curious Case of Inexistent Acts 
Apart from the above theories of absolute nullity, a third and 
lesser-known subclass of these types of nullities exists. This final 
subclass of absolute nullities consists of acts that are null not 
because they violate public policy but because they are permanently 
defective insofar as they are not really juridical acts at all; they are 
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inexistent acts. As Planiol has noted, “An act is inexistent when it 
lacks an element essential to its formation and when this element is 
such that the act cannot be conceived of with this feature absent 
from it.”235 Thus, a purported contract lacking in capacity, cause, 
consent, or object would not be a contract but rather an inexistent 
act. That is, “[i]f two persons wished to make a sale, and failed to fix 
a price, there is no sale. Nothing has been done.”236 
At first appearance, the idea of discussing acts that do not exist 
seems bizarre. Although an act lacking capacity, consent, cause, or 
object can be said to be an inexistent contract, it could also be an 
inexistent sale, donation, or lease. That is, there is something 
metaphysical in the discussion of acts that do not exist. After all, 
there are an infinite number of inexistent acts (sales, leases, etc.) that 
occur (or, more properly fail to occur) every day. 
Aside from that theoretical discussion, though, there is a 
practical reason for entering into the amorphous terrain of inexistent 
acts. Because many acts that are juridically inexistent seem valid in 
appearance, a theory and understanding of their defects and juridical 
inexistence is necessary. For example, if A, wanting to buy B’s 
house, concocts a fake act of sale, signs his name as buyer, and 
forges B’s name as seller, no sale has occurred because the 
purported act of sale, lacking consent (namely of B), does not legally 
exist.237 It is a juridically inexistent act and therefore without effect. 
The origin of the theory of inexistent acts appears to come from 
German scholars, but French writers were quickly attracted to the 
idea to solve a practical problem in their Code.238 Namely, the 
theory of inexistent acts was endorsed “to deprive certain [marital] 
unions of all civil effect even though the law had omitted to 
pronounce their nullity. . . . It has since then been adopted by all the 
commentators, happy to find in it a means of getting out of an 
embarrassment and of annulling marriages without a text.”239 
Although the theory of “inexistent acts” is well known in 
continental legal scholarship, scholars do not all agree on how to 
explain it. The French commentator Gaudemet explained that the 
classical division of nullities separated absolute from relative 
nullities but that later commentators added a third category of 
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“inexistence.”240 Gaudemet explained that the original purpose of 
the distinction between absolute and relative nullities was that 
contracts that lacked an essential element of formation did not exist 
and thus were absolutely null and those that were affected with vices 
were annullable.241  
Therefore, the difference of the two sanctions is explained 
by the difference in their reasons for being. In the first case, 
the contract is not viable. It is missing an essential organ. It 
is born dead. In the second, the contract is complete, but 
affected with a vice. It is a sick organism that will fight 
(confirmation) or die (annulment).242  
The concept of relative nullity, and thus annulability, was born 
of a praetorian procedure for contracts entered into by minors, by 
which the praetor did not declare the contract null but allowed the 
party to address the praetor for relief.243 “Therefore it appeared, 
precisely in the modern case of annulability, the idea of a 
provisionally valid contract, but which can be rendered ineffective 
by a decision of the magistrate.”244 
The idea of inexistence was created to separate two subclasses 
of absolute nullity, namely those acts that violate a provision of law 
and are truly null, and those acts that are missing an element and are 
more accurately inexistent.245 The practical difference between 
inexistent acts and absolutely null ones in French law is that 
inexistent ones need not be judicially declared but absolutely null 
ones do.246  Many authors, however, have rejected this distinction as 
without utility and have observed that the absence of a factual 
element of a transaction or contract should not be considered 
different from the absence of a legal element.247 
Despite the above debate, most authors consider it impossible to 
reject the category of inexistent acts, even though many consider 
“[i]nexistence . . . [a]s entirely distinct from cases of nullity.”248 In 
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discussing inexistent acts, Planiol noted that “[t]here is no need of 
considering cases of inexistence except when the act has been made 
out in fact and proof of this is given.”249 Thus, as a general matter 
inexistent acts need not be considered; those acts that appear to exist 
but which are legally ineffective, however, merit attention. In 
contrast to an inexistent act, which lacks one of the prerequisites 
necessary for creation of the act, “[t]he [absolutely] null act is one 
which has all the elements necessary to its existence but is not given 
effect because it contravenes a command or a prohibition of the 
law.”250  
Louisiana law, however, appears to leave no doctrinal room for 
the existence of a distinct category of “inexistent acts” separate and 
apart from the absolute nullity. Article 2029 provides that “[a] 
contract is null when the requirements for its formation have not 
been met.”251 The requirements for contract formation are well 
known: capacity, consent, cause, and object.252 Thus, it is clear that 
in Louisiana, article 2029 limits all problems with contracts to either 
absolute or relative nullities, relative when a defect exists with 
regard to a particular element, e.g., consent is tainted with fraud, and 
absolute when an element does not exist at all. 
The treatment of inexistent acts as a subclass of absolute nullity 
in Louisiana is important for a number of reasons. By classifying 
these acts (or lack of acts) as absolute nullities, it is clear that their 
invalidity could always be attacked and would never prescribe.253 
Moreover, their nullity could be raised by anyone or even by the 
court.254 While these two consequences hardly seem significant 
enough to merit discussion, the third effect of absolute nullity is 
important, namely, the ability vel non of confirming an inexistent 
act. 
For example, if A grants a mortgage to B, which B duly accepts 
and records, but A forgets to sign the act of mortgage, the mortgage 
is clearly null and without effect.255 If A’s omission was 
unintentional and A wishes to remedy the mistake, question remains 
as to whether A must execute the mortgage anew or whether A can 
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merely confirm the earlier putative act. If A must execute the 
mortgage anew, the mortgage will have effect only from the day of 
its new execution.256 On the other hand, if A can confirm the 
previous “inexistent” mortgage, then B’s right as mortgagee will be 
given effect from the date of the original failed attempt to execute 
the mortgage, a right that could be very significant if intervening 
security interests are created.257 Because the original attempted 
mortgage was inexistent, the law classifies it as an absolute nullity, 
deprives it of effect, and precludes it from being confirmed. Thus, 
B’s rights as mortgagee would date only from the time of execution 
of the new mortgage.258 
i. A Case Study in Contract Formation 
It is hornbook law that “[i]n order to form a valid contract, the 
parties must have sufficient capacity, give their consent freely for a 
certain object, and the contract must have a lawful purpose.”259 
Omission of or defect in any of the above elements results in nullity, 
but not all defects or omissions are of equal significance. Where 
consent to a contract is obtained under duress, the contract is not 
void ab initio but results in an enforceable contract that must be 
annulled to deprive it of its effect.260 A mistake as to price or thing 
in a sale, on the other hand, may result in no “meetings of the 
minds” and thus “no enforceable contract” at all.261 For example, in 
Marcantel v. Jefferson Door Co., where the plaintiffs ordered all-
wood cabinets and the defendant had cabinets delivered that were 
partially made of laminated particle board, the court found that no 
meeting of the minds had occurred and “no contract existed between 
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the parties . . . . Because there was no contract perfected, ownership 
of the cabinets did not transfer to the” plaintiffs.262 In other words, 
contracts lacking formative elements are void or absolutely null, 
whereas those confected defectively are merely voidable or 
relatively null. 
The theory and concept of inexistence is necessary for a 
complete understanding of juridical acts. As will be demonstrated 
below, the absence of an element of contract formation—capacity, 
consent, cause, and object—prevents the formation of a contract or 
juridical act, so the concept of inexistence is needed for a proper 
explanation.  
(a) Capacity 
A minor child who executes an act of sale for a home has no 
capacity to enter into the contract and execute the act of sale.263 The 
child does not suffer from a total absence of capacity but rather 
defective capacity. That is, the child has the capacity of personhood, 
although not a level of mental capacity sufficient to enter into 
contractual relations.264 In fact, total absence of capacity is difficult 
to envision indeed, at least for natural persons, as the concept of 
natural capacity requires only biological existence.265 Prior law, 
however, furnished an example. Article 1489 of the 1870 Code 
provided that “[d]octors of physic or surgeons, who have 
professionally attended a person during the sickness of which he 
dies, can not receive any benefit from donations inter vivos or mortis 
causa made in their favor by the sick person during that 
sickness.”266 Such individuals did not have a defective capacity by 
which they needed assistance in accepting donations, but rather they 
suffered from a complete and total incapacity under which they 
could not receive donations by virtue of their incapacity. Thus, a 
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purported contract of donation with one of the above persons 
resulted in “no juridical act at all.”267 
Further, one can better envision the problem in the context of 
juridical persons. Consider, for example, a situation in which a 
partnership, whose foundational document excludes it from owning 
immovable property, enters into an act of sale for a tract of land. 
Here, the juridical person has capacity by virtue of its foundational 
documents.268 However, its ability to enter into a transaction by 
which it acquires immovable property is not defective but rather 
nonexistent. It is not as if the partnership needs help or assistance (as 
a minor child would) in acquiring immovable property. It is 
expressly prohibited from doing so and thus suffers from an 
incapacity to hold the right, rather than a mere incapacity to enjoy it. 
Therefore, a purported contract by such a corporation for the 
acquisition of land would be missing one of the essential elements 
for contract formation, rendering it inexistent and absolutely null. 
(b) Consent 
By far, the most common instances of problematic consent 
involve fraud, duress, or certain types of error, which vitiate consent 
and render the contract relatively null.269 For example, when jewelry 
store employees scheme to make a customer think a ring is worth 
less than its actual value, fraud can vitiate the contract and render it 
relatively null.270 
Be that as it may, there are some vices of consent that prevent 
contract formation and thus result in absolute nullities or inexistent 
acts. French doctrine sometimes refers to these kinds of vices that 
prevent formation of a contract as erreur-obstacle because the error 
serves as an obstacle to the creation of a contract.271 Although 
common in French doctrine, the concept of erreur-obstacle is not 
well accepted in Louisiana scholarship. Professor Litvinoff stated 
that “since the revision of 1825, there is no room in the Louisiana 
Civil Code for the doctrine of erreur-obstacle, because of its careful 
enumeration of different categories of error, all of which are just 
vices of consent and give rise to a nullity which is only relative.”272 
Louisiana courts, however, have recognized a kind of error that 
prevents contract formation, though under the Anglo-American 
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concept rather than the French. What the French consider erreur-
obstacle, Anglo-American courts find a lack of a “meeting of the 
minds.”273 Or, “[t]o put the argument in the form in which it is 
familiar in English law, erreur-obstacle is not so much a mistake as 
a failure of the acceptance to coincide with the offer.”274 
Whatever the name given to the kind of error that prevents 
contractual formation, the concept is a useful one that has been 
recognized in the jurisprudence. In the famous case of Lyons Milling 
Co. v. Cusimano, the plaintiff needed high gluten flour to make 
macaroni and ordered from the defendant Telegram flour, “f.o.b. 
Lyons,” Kansas, by which he intended Telegram flour from the 
Lyons mill.275 The defendant, however, sent him Telegram flour 
from his mill in Hudson, Kansas (which had a lower gluten content) 
but paid the freight to transport it from Lyons to New Orleans.276 In 
short, the plaintiff meant one thing, and the defendant meant 
another. Thus, the contract lacked the essential element of consent 
from its formation. In other words, the parties did not have a 
meeting of the minds on the type of flour to be bought and sold, or 
suffered from an erreur-obstacle. 
Moreover, in Kaufman v. Audubon Ford/Audubon Imports, Inc., 
the court considered a situation in which one party to an automobile 
sale contract concealed that he was the agent for a third party from 
Taiwan to whom the cars would be exported in violation of the 
manufacturer’s export agreement policy.277 The district court found 
that the concealment “was sufficient to vitiate the contract for want 
of consent on the part of the Appellant.”278 In affirming the district 
court’s opinion, the court of appeal stated that “there must be a 
meeting of the minds” and that error could vitiate the necessary 
consent.279 In conclusion, the court stated: 
[T]he concealment by the Appellant of the fact that Mr. Vee 
was the intended purchaser and that the Appellant intended 
to export the vehicles was sufficient, therefore, in the case at 
bar, to vitiate the contract for want of consent on the part of 
the Appellee; thus, there is no valid contract.280 
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(c) Cause 
It is almost unthinkable to discuss ineffectual cause in terms 
other than those of absolute nullity. Cause either exists and is lawful, 
in which case the contract is valid, or it does not exist and is 
unlawful, in which case the contract is absolutely null.281 Defective 
cause does not exist the way defective consent does, and thus 
problems with cause result in absolute nullities and not relative 
ones.282 For example, a contract to stifle bids at an auction has an 
illegal or illicit cause and renders the contract an absolute nullity.283 
A private detective contract, the compensation for which depends on 
the dissolution of a marriage, is similarly against public policy and 
null.284 
Although no relative nullities exist with respect to cause, there 
are instances of problematic “cause” that more clearly are examples 
of inexistent acts insofar as they preclude contractual formation, as 
opposed to invalidating a contract for reasons of public policy. In 
other words, “[i]f there is no cause, the obligation is as ineffectual as 
a Roman nudum pactum.”285 For example, if at the time a contract 
of sale is made the thing that is its object has been destroyed, then 
the buyer cannot be bound to pay the price as ownership of a 
nonexistent thing cannot be transferred. The obligation then lacks a 
cause—therefore, it is not an obligation at all. Likewise, the promise 
of a gift made in contemplation of a future marriage is not 
enforceable if the marriage does not take place.286 Again, the 
obligation lacks a cause as the reason for the promise proved to be 
absent.287 Thus, if the cause of an obligation is “absent,” no contract 
exists, and any act that purports to be so is inexistent. 
(d) Object 
As with cause, most classic cases of problematic contractual 
objects involve situations of illicit objects leading to public policy 
nullities. Cases involving absolute nullities due to objects contrary 
to public policy include contracts for drug paraphernalia288 and 
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gambling debts.289 But other types of absolute nullities may exist 
even in the face of an object not obviously contrary to public policy. 
That is, in cases in which no object exists or when an object is not 
“determined at least as to its kind” an absolute nullity results, not 
because it is clearly contrary to public policy but because of the 
nonexistence of an object altogether, thus resulting in an inexistent 
juridical act.290 
For example, in Kite v. Gus Kaplan, Inc., the Court examined 
whether a provision in a lease granting a store owner authority to 
relocate one of its tenants gave it the authority to do so without prior 
notice and without adequately ensuring suitability for the tenant’s 
jewelry business.291 The Louisiana Supreme Court correctly held 
that “[a]n obligation to provide changed space, without specifying in 
what respect(s) the space could be changed, is one indefinite as to its 
object within the contemplation of La. Civ. Code art. 1973.”292 
Quoting Planiol, the Court stated that “[t]he obligatory relationship 
is not formed when the object of the obligation is not 
determined.”293 Although the Court rescued this lease due to vague 
provisions and concluded that under the rules of contractual 
interpretation and obligations of good faith the lease did not provide 
for such authority, had the lease been more specific, the object 
would have been indeterminable and thus resulted in an inexistent 
act.294 
ii. Sales, Marriages, and Other Contracts 
Aside from the basic exposition of contract formation law, the 
theory of inexistent acts can readily be seen in all varieties of legal 
transactions. Consider the case where A agrees to buy sweet 
potatoes from B for the “market price.”295 No market, however, is 
stated, and extrinsic evidence reveals that A and B did not even 
tacitly or impliedly agree on which market, much less how the 
market price would be determined. Here, the parties, despite the 
external statements to the contrary, have not confected a sale. 
Article 2464 of the Louisiana Civil Code states that “[t]he price 
must be fixed by the parties in a sum either certain or determinable 
through a method agreed by them. There is no sale unless the parties 
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intended that a price be paid.”296 As Planiol observed, “If two 
persons wished to make a sale, and failed to fix a price, there is no 
sale. Nothing has been done.”297 Thus, the attempted sale is 
inexistent and an absolute nullity. French doctrine and jurisprudence 
is in accord.298 
In the family law context, the absence of one or more of the 
necessary elements for marriage likewise results in an inexistent act 
and thus an absolute nullity. Although article 95 provides that “[a] 
marriage is relatively null when the consent of one of the parties to 
marry is not freely given,”299 article 94, detailing those instances 
when a marriage is an absolute nullity, curiously does not include 
the absence of consent—the very issue raised in City of Shreveport 
v. Burling.300 In Burling, the city of Shreveport sought to terminate 
Ms. Young’s retirement benefits, which she had been receiving as a 
widow, because she was alleged to have remarried.301 The city’s 
belief appears to have been well-founded because Ms. Young and 
Mr. Burling, who had an existing relationship, concocted a “sham 
marriage” “in order to placate [Ms. Young’s elderly] mother, her 
daughter, and avoid an appearance of impropriety to the live-in 
grand-daughter.”302 The ceremony, although presided over by a 
reverend, “did not include an exchange of rings or any statement of 
consent to be married.”303 Similarly, the reverend “did not 
pronounce them man and wife,” and the attending witnesses testified 
that the event “did not appear to be a marriage ceremony.”304 
Although the court correctly concluded that no marriage existed, its 
explanation was based upon the lack of the parties’ intent to 
marry.305 More precisely, however, the marriage did not exist 
because the essential element of consent was completely absent, as 
well as, perhaps, the marriage ceremony. 
In fact, the Civil Code itself provides at least two other explicit 
examples of inexistent acts. The first involving the sale of a thing of 
another in article 2452, and the second involving the annuity 
contract in article 2782. Although article 2452 declares somewhat 
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cryptically that “[t]he sale of a thing belonging to another does not 
convey ownership,”306 this situation is best described as an example 
of an inexistent act.307 In a case involving the sale of a thing of 
another, the seller has nothing to transfer to the buyer, who has paid 
for a thing the seller does not own and cannot transfer. Here, the sale 
of a thing of another is a sale without an object, and thus one of the 
formative elements of the contract of sale is missing.308 As has been 
explained elsewhere, “[t]he transmission of ownership is the object 
of the sale,”309 and thus a sale where no ownership can be 
transferred has no object and is missing a constituent element. This 
was, in earlier times, the widespread opinion in France.310 And 
Louisiana scholars have noted that “[i]n the situation contemplated 
in article 2452 the contract fails because of legal impossibility.”311 
Prior to the 1984 Obligations revision, article 2452 of the 1870 
Code, the predecessor to current article 2452, stated unequivocally 
that “[t]he sale of a thing belonging to another is null.”312 Moreover, 
the official comments to the current article indicate that although the 
article is “new” and “[i]n spite of its different language, it does not 
                                                                                                             
 306. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2452 (2014). 
 307. But see LEVASSEUR & GRUNING, supra note 60, at 28 (“Such a sale looks 
very much like a sale under a suspensive condition that the seller acquires 
ownership of the thing so as to transfer it to the buyer.”). Unfortunately, however, 
this approach explains neither the context of the article, the historical evolution of 
the article, nor its application in all circumstances. The placement of the article in 
the Civil Code, under the Chapter Heading “Of Things Which May Be Sold,” 
rather than in the Chapter on “Perfection” of a sale (where, in fact, the other 
articles dealing with effective sales that suspend the transfer of ownership, e.g., 
article 2460, are placed) further lends credence to the idea that this article concerns 
not merely the “effects” of a sale but rather its formation. Moreover, if the drafters 
intended such a result, they certainly knew how to say so. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 2450 (2014) (stating that in the case of a sale of a future thing, “the coming 
into existence of the thing is a condition that suspends the effects of the sale”); Id. 
art. 2460 (stating that in a sale on view or trial, “ownership is not transferred from 
the seller to the buyer until the latter gives approval of the thing”). Finally, 
although this approach accurately explains the effects of a sale between parties 
who contemplate that the owner will in the future acquire a thing, which would in 
turn be transferred to the buyer, it does not explain the situation in which a seller, 
knowing he or she is not the owner of a thing, deceptively sells someone else’s 
property to the buyer. To say that this is a valid sale, the effects of which are 
suspended until the seller acquires the thing (which he or she has no intention of 
doing) from the true owner, would be curious indeed.  
 308. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1971 (2014). 
 309. 14 Fenet, supra note 50, at 157 (author’s translation). 
 310. PHILIPPE MALAURIE, LAURENT AYNES, & PIERRE-YVES GAUTIER, LES 
CONTRATS SPÉCIAUX 131 (2011) (“Rationnellement – au XIXe siècle dernier ce fut 
une opinion répandue . . . la nullité aurait dû être absolue, puisque manqué à la 
vente une élément essential, la chose.”). 
 311. SAÚL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS 52 (1969). 
 312. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2452 (1870). 
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change the law as stated in the source article.”313 French Civil Code 
article 1599, the source article to the Louisiana provision, likewise 
declares such sales “null.”314 The comments to 2452 similarly 
recognize that the buyer may bring an “action for nullity.”315 
Similarly, article 2782, which prescribes the termination point 
for the annuity contract, provides that “[i]n the absence of a 
designated term, an annuity established . . . in favor of a juridical 
person is without effect.”316 Early drafts of the article vacillated 
between whether the effect of not stipulating a term would create a 
relative or absolute nullity.317 In the end, the term “nullity” was 
removed from the article entirely, and the circumlocution of the 
annuity being “without effect” was agreed upon.318 The 
terminological obfuscation notwithstanding, this article provides a 
clear instance of an absolute nullity that is created by virtue of an 
act’s inexistence. Article 2781 creates the foundational requirement 
that all annuity contracts must be “for the lifetime of a designated 
natural person, or alternatively, for a period of time.”319 The 
comments to article 2782 make clear the importance of the 
                                                                                                             
 313. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2452 cmt. a (2014). 
 314. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1599 (Fr.). 
 315. Art. 2452 cmt. e. Similarly, a sale is inexistent when the “thing” or the 
“object” of a sale is already owned by the buyer. Article 2443 of the Louisiana 
Civil Code provides that “[a] person cannot purchase a thing he already owns.” Id. 
art. 2443. The comments make clear that the nullity involved here is an absolute 
one as the “transaction whereby a person purchases a thing he already owns 
clearly results from the legal impossibility to make such a purchase.” Id. cmt. b. 
The 1870 version of the Civil Code was clearer and, at the same time, more 
opaque. Article 2443 of the 1870 Code stated that “[h]e who is already the owner 
of a thing, cannot validly purchase it. If he buys it through error, thinking it the 
property of another, the act is null, and the price must be restored to him.” LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 2443 (1870). Although the effect of such a sale was clearly decreed 
to be a nullity, the use of the term “through error” created the risk that it may be 
mistaken for a relative nullity because of a vice of consent, rather than an absolute 
one due to a lack of object. 
 316. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2782 (2014). 
 317. See RENTS OF LANDS & ANNUITIES COMM., LA. STATE LAW INST., DRAFT 
DOCUMENT FOR THE COUNCIL MEETING ON FEBRUARY 10, 2012, at 8 (2012) 
(characterizing an annuity without a term in favor of a juridical person as a relative 
nullity); RENTS OF LAND & ANNUITIES COMM., LA. STATE LAW INST., PROPOSED 
REVISIONS TO LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE, BOOK III—TITLE X. OF RENTS AND 
ANNUITIES, PREPARED FOR THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL ON FEBRUARY 11, 
2011, at 10 (2011) (characterizing an annuity without a term in favor of a juridical 
person as absolutely null); RENTS OF LAND & ANNUITIES COMM., LA. STATE LAW 
INST., PROPOSED REVISIONS TO LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE, BOOK III—TITLE X. OF 
RENTS AND ANNUITIES, PREPARED FOR THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL ON MAR. 
12, 2010, at 8 (2010) (characterizing an annuity without a term in favor of a 
juridical person as merely null). 
 318. Art. 2782. 
 319. Id. art. 2781. 
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designated period of time and its status as a foundational element of 
the annuity contract: “[A]n annuity established in favor of a juridical 
person is without effect because a substantive legal requirement for 
the formation of the contract has not been met.”320 In other words, a 
foundational requirement for the annuity contract is missing, and 
thus the purported contract is without effect because it cannot exist. 
Although the classic explanation of absolute or public policy 
nullities and relative or private interest ones covers many of the 
common instances of nullity, it is ill-equipped to explain the full 
range of absolute nullities that exist. Defects in solemn form 
requirements are not obviously violative of public policy but are 
absolute nullities nonetheless.  Similarly, contracts that are missing 
an essential element are juridically inexistent and therefore properly 
classified as absolute nullities as well, even though the relation of 
these acts to public policy is tenuous at best. Only the permanency 
of the defects that affects all of these transactions, it is posited, can 
fully explain their proper classifications and effects. 
IV. MIXED NULLITIES 
Although relative and absolute nullities exhaust the universe of 
categories recognized explicitly in the Code, both legislation and 
jurisprudence recognize a series of transactions that do not easily fit 
within one of the above-defined categories. As discussed, absolute 
nullities are imprescriptible, are not confirmable, and may be 
invoked by anyone.321 Contrastingly, relative nullities are 
prescriptible, may be confirmed, and can only be invoked by the 
parties in whose favor they are established.322 Questions exist as to 
how to characterize nullities that show elements of each. 
The presentation of merely two kinds of nullities is too 
simplistic.323 “The simple dichotomy of ‘void’ and ‘voidable’ (or 
absolute and relative nullity) is not adequate to describe the various 
ways in which the law refuses to a greater or less[er] extent to give 
effect to contracts, marriages and other juristic acts.”324 There are at 
least three different types of nullities: absolute, relative, and mixed. 
Thus, this Article proposes that the more appropriate way of 
thinking about nullities is along a spectrum ranging from absolute to 
relative with many mixtures of the two in between. 
 
                                                                                                             
 320. Id. art. 2782. 
 321. Id. arts. 2030, 2032. 
 322. Id. arts. 2031, 2032. 
 323. MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 166, at 310. 
 324. A. M. Honoré, Degrees of Invalidity, 75 S. AFRICAN L. J. 32 (1958). 
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A. Cases of Mixed Nullities 
A mixed nullity contains elements of absolute nullity and 
relative nullity. As such, one cannot merely assume, for example, 
that because a nullity is subject to a prescriptive period, it bears all 
the hallmarks of a relative nullity. Similarly, one cannot simply 
conclude that because a nullity can be invoked by anyone that it 
demonstrates all elements of an absolute nullity. 
For example, if A attempts to make a donation to B by virtue of 
an act under private signature, the donation is null. Prior to the 
revision in 2008, article 1536 simply stated that “[a]n act shall be 
passed before a notary public and two witnesses of every donation 
inter vivos . . . under the penalty of nullity.”325 It did not, however, 
discuss the character of the nullity. 
Ascertaining whether a nullity is absolute or relative is not an 
easy task. Form requirements, in general, require close examination. 
To ascertain whether a nullity is absolute or relative, one needs to 
ask whether the grounds for which the form requirements are 
established are cautionary or evidentiary. As discussed above,326 
when the form requirements exist for evidentiary purposes, failure to 
follow the form does not necessarily result in an absolute nullity. 
That is, “the juridical act may produce effects even when the 
formality has been omitted, although subject to the uncertainty of 
                                                                                                             
 325. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1536 (1870). This article specifically made reference 
to donations of “immovable property or incorporeal things.” Id. Article 1538, 
however, required that a donation, “even of movable effects,” “be passed of the 
same.” Id. art. 1538. Article 1539, however, created an exception for corporeal 
movables, which may be donated by “manual gift . . . accompanied by real 
delivery.” Id. art. 1539. The current law now makes clear that all donations must 
be confected by authentic act, except those of corporeal movable things and those 
of certain other incorporeal movables. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1541, 1543, 1550 
(2014). 
 326. See supra Part III.B.2.b. 
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securing proof other than witnesses or presumptions. That is why 
such a formality is evidentiary rather than cautionary.”327  
With regard to donations, however, “it is elementary that . . . 
form is of the essence, and that, to have a binding force, the act shall 
be passed before a notary public and two witnesses.”328 In other 
words, the form requirements here serve a solemn or cautionary 
function, rather than an evidentiary one. That is, the form 
requirement is imposed out of a concern about the gratuitous nature 
of the disposition and out of a concern that the donor fully and freely 
appreciates the consequences of his or her act. By virtue of “the 
process of concurring to the execution of a writing with such a high 
degree of formality, the donor is given an opportunity to realize that 
he is irrevocably divesting himself of the property he donates.”329 
Moreover, the jurisprudence is clear: “We have said that donations 
inter vivos are solemn contracts . . . .”330 
Thus, the nullity that exists here clearly appears to be an 
absolute one, and the jurisprudence in Louisiana supports this view. 
In Ducote v. Ducote, the court in examining an inter vivos donation 
in improper form clearly stated that because 
the act before us is not authentic, we reject the contention 
that it can be made effective through action provided in 
either of the above articles. The purported donation of 
immovable and incorporeal property can be considered as 
nothing more than an act under private signature duly 
acknowledged and, as such, is absolutely null.331 
The recent revision to the donations inter vivos articles in 2008 
makes this point nearly incontrovertible.332 Article 1541 now states 
that “[a] donation inter vivos shall be made by authentic act under 
the penalty of absolute nullity, unless otherwise expressly permitted 
by law.”333 
Appearances, however, may be deceiving. Although the form 
requirements for a donation inter vivos exist for solemn or 
cautionary purposes and appear to give rise to an absolute nullity, if 
such were the case, a donation null for lack of form would be 
imprescriptible and unconfirmable.334 Article 1845, however, 
provides that “[a] donation inter vivos that is null for lack of proper 
                                                                                                             
 327. LITVINOFF, supra note 125, § 12.12, at 294. 
 328. Cawthon v. Kimbell, 15 So. 101, 103 (La. 1894). 
 329. LITVINOFF, supra note 125, § 12.12, at 294. 
 330. Cawthon, 15 So. at 103 (emphasis added).  
 331. 442 So. 2d 1299, 1301–02 (La. Ct. App. 1983). 
 332. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1541 (2014). 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. arts. 2030, 2032. 
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form may be confirmed by the donor but the confirmation must be 
made in the form required for a donation.”335 The confirmation of a 
donation available under article 1845 is one of the classic hallmarks 
of a relative nullity, not an absolute one.336 This confirmation is to 
be distinguished from the re-execution of the donation anew, which 
would be required if the original donation was absolutely null.337 
The confirmation available for relative nullities and the re-execution 
allowed for absolute ones differ in an important way. Although the 
re-execution of an act invalid for reasons of form has effects from 
the day of re-execution, “[a] valid confirmation . . . has effects 
retroactive to the date of the original invalid donation.”338 Having 
seen that an inter vivos donation that is null for want of form has 
indications of both absolute (i.e., solemnity of form) and relative 
nullities (i.e., confirmability), the appropriate classification then is 
that this kind of nullity falls in the middle of the spectrum and 
results in a “mixed” nullity.339 
The above example is not an isolated anomaly. In fact, the Civil 
Code and jurisprudence are littered with mixed nullities. Consider, 
again, the issue of article 2447.340 Article 2447 states that “[o]fficers 
of a court, such as judges, attorneys, clerks, and law enforcement 
agents, cannot purchase litigious rights under contestation in a 
jurisdiction of that court.”341 If such a purchase occurs by one 
afflicted with this incapacity, “[t]he purchase of a litigious right by 
such an officer is [absolutely] null.”342 Assuming the more recent 
cases are correct in their characterization, one could reasonably 
conclude that any purported purchase of litigious rights by an officer 
of a court where the rights are under contestation has no effect, is 
imprescriptible, is unconfirmable, and can be raised by anyone—the 
necessary consequences of an absolute nullity.343 
Such a conclusion, however, would be too hasty. The 
jurisprudence has repeatedly stated that the nullity can only be 
                                                                                                             
 335. Id. art. 1845. 
 336. See id. art. 2031. 
 337. Id. art. 2030. 
 338. Id. cmt. b. 
 339. Given this classification, one must ask a further question with regard to 
the prescriptive period for challenging the nullity here and who has the right to do 
so. If the nullity is an absolute one, the challenge to the donation could be brought 
by anyone, and the nullity would be imprescriptible. Id. arts. 2030, 2032. If, on the 
other hand, the nullity is relative, then only the party in whose favor the nullity 
was established could challenge it, and he or she would have to do so within five 
years. Id. arts. 2031, 2032. 
 340. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 341. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2447 (2014). 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. arts. 2030, 2032, 2033. 
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invoked by the other party against whom the right is exercised.344 
The comments to article 2447, written after the 1993 revision, also 
reflect this limitation on suit.345 If such is the case, then one of the 
necessary consequences of an absolute nullity, i.e., the ability to be 
raised by anyone, does not occur here. Thus, once again, the Code 
provides an example of an instance that fits neither on the absolute 
or relative end of the nullity spectrum and more appropriately 
belongs somewhere in-between. 
B. Cases of Jurisprudential Confusion Not Resulting in a Mixed 
Nullity 
The existence of the category of mixed nullity is not posited to 
suggest that every instance of confused jurisprudential application 
can be easily dispensed with by tossing it into the bin of mixed 
nullities. Consider, for instance, article 1498 of the Civil Code 
governing the issue of donations omnium bonorum, which are acts 
by which individuals gratuitously divest themselves of all of their 
goods.346 The Code declares such an act to be null if the donor has 
failed to reserve enough for subsistence.347 This prohibition has 
existed in Louisiana law since the Code of 1825 but has no history 
or correspondence in the Code Napoleon. Instead, this article is 
traceable to the Spanish law, namely the Recopiliacion de 
Castille.348 
To ascertain the type of nullity involved, courts have looked to 
the purpose of the prohibition. Most recently, in 2007, the court in 
Trahan v. Bertrand stated that “[i]t is well settled that the public 
policy behind this statute is to prevent a donor from divesting 
him/herself of all of their property such that they become a ward of 
the state.”349 As such, it would clearly be an absolute nullity and 
thus imprescriptible, which the courts have recognized.350 But, if the 
nullity established by a donation omnium bonorum is an absolute 
                                                                                                             
 344. Saint v. Martel, 47 So. 413 (La. 1918). See also Gilkerson-Sloss Com’n 
Co. v. Bond, 11 So. 220 (La. 1892); Swords v. Cortinas, 4 La. App. 145 (La. Ct. 
App. 1926); McCarty v. Splane, 8 La. Ann. 482 (La. 1852). 
 345. Art. 2447 cmt. b (stating “that nullity can be invoked only by the party to 
the suit against whom the right is to be exercised”).  
 346. Id. art. 1498. 
 347. Id. 
 348. Lagrange v. Barre, 11 Rob. 302, 306 (La. 1845). 
 349. Trahan v. Bertrand, 952 So. 2d 809, 812 (La. Ct. App. 2007). 
 350. Lagrange, 11 Rob. 302; Trahan, 952 So. 2d 809; Broussard v. Doucet, 
107 So. 2d 448 (La. 1958); Abshire v. Levine, 546 So. 2d 642 (La. Ct. App. 
1989); Owen v. Owen, 325 So. 2d 283 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Givens v. Givens, 273 
So. 2d 863 (La. Ct. App. 1973). 
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one, then it also cannot be confirmed and can be raised by 
anyone.351 
Numerous cases have considered the issue of who can raise the 
nullity of a donation omnium bonorum. Although it is clear that the 
donor can raise the nullity that afflicts a donation omnium bonorum, 
others generally cannot. Courts have denied this right to collateral 
heirs352 but granted it to forced heirs after the death of the donor.353 
In addressing the very issue of how an act that is absolutely null can 
be raised only by a select group of individuals, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court has confusingly stated that “[t]he nullity declared by 
article 1497 of the Civil Code is absolute only relatively to the 
particular persons in whose special interest it was passed.”354 
Similarly, although it was argued above that an inter vivos 
donation in improper form is a mixed nullity, such is not the case for 
a donation mortis causa not executed in the form of a valid 
testament. Here, the difference, although technical and not 
motivated by the strongest policy reasons, is clearly recognized in 
the provisions of the Civil Code. Article 1573 unequivocally states 
that “[t]he formalities prescribed for the execution of a testament 
must be observed or the testament is absolutely null” and no other 
provision of the Civil Code casts doubt upon this classification.355 
Article 1573 came in anew with the 1997 revision to the law of 
successions, but the sparse comments indicate that “[i]t does not 
change the law” and is based on article 1595 from the Code of 
1870.356 In the Code of 1870, article 1595 provided that “[t]he 
formalities, to which testaments are subject by the provisions of the 
present section, must be observed; otherwise the testaments are null 
and void.”357 Although the language is not identical, article 1595 of 
the 1870 Code was substantively similar to its predecessor in the 
Code of 1825, the Digest of 1808, and the French Code Napoleon of 
                                                                                                             
 351. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2030 (2014). 
 352. See, e.g., Bernard v. Noel, 13 So. 737 (La. 1893). 
 353. See, e.g., Succession of Turgeau, 58 So. 497 (La. 1912); Maxwell v. 
Maxwell, 156 So. 166 (La. 1934); Haynes v. Haynes, 848 So. 2d 35 (La. Ct. App. 
2003); Owen, 325 So. 2d 283; Succession of Moran v. Moran, 25 So. 2d 302 (La. 
Ct. App. 1946). 
 354. Bernard, 13 So. at 738. But see Pardue v. Turnage, 383 So. 2d 804 (La. 
Ct. App. 1980) (reviewing a trial court opinion finding the existence of a donation 
omnium bonorum raised not by the parties, but by the court itself). 
 355. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1573 (2014) (emphasis added). With respect to 
donations inter vivos, however, see id. art. 1845 (regarding confirmation of 
donations inter vivos executed in improper form). 
 356. Id. art. 1573. 
 357. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1595 (1870). 
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1804.358 In short, a donation mortis causa not in proper form is an 
absolute nullity.359 This means, of course, that it can be raised by 
anyone, cannot be confirmed, and most importantly is 
imprescriptible.  
Be that as it may, courts have routinely held that the ability to 
challenge a will based upon a defect in form is subject to a liberative 
prescriptive period. Article 3479 states that “[a]n action for 
annulment of a testament” is “subject to a liberative prescription of 
five years.”360 This article was added to the Code in 1983, but the 
prior versions of it date back to the Civil Code of 1825 and provide 
essentially the same thing—that testaments could not be annulled 
after five years.361 Under the old law, the courts treated this 
prescription on nullifying testaments as applying to formal defects in 
wills. For example, as far back as the 1800s, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court stated that “[i]t is true, defects of form in a will are absolute 
nullities, but we think it is well settled that such nullities may be 
cured by the lapse of time.”362  
The actual genesis of the prescriptive period here stems from the 
Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Martin, a case that 
involved former Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court, Francois 
Xavier Martin.363 In that case, the Court stated the issue as follows: 
“Could Francois Xavier Martin, after he became blind, make any 
dispositions mortis causâ, in the olographic form?”364 In answering 
its own question, the Court concluded: 
We are called upon to decree the nullity of a solemn act of 
last will, neither declared to be null, nor expressly 
prohibited, by law. The nullity alleged is purely one of form, 
as it is conceded that the testator, notwithstanding his 
blindness, might lawfully have made a nuncupative will. It is 
not, in legal intendment, an absolute nullity, since it may be 
cured by lapse of time, or by voluntary execution or 
ratification on the part of the heirs at law, and, if enforced, 
leaves them under a natural obligation to execute the will. 
Civil Code, arts. 3507, 1751. 7 Toullier, nos. 554 to 565. It is 
not asked by the foreign heirs, on the ground that the 
                                                                                                             
 358. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1588 (1825); LA. CIV. CODE art. 108 (1808); C. CIV. 
(Fr.) Art 1001 (1804). 
 359. Art. 1573. 
 360. Id. art. 3497. 
 361. See Act No. 173, 1983 La. Acts 429; LA. CIV. CODE art. 3542 (1870); LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 3507 (1825). 
 362. Callais v. Semere, 10 La. Ann. 684 (La. 1855). 
 363. 2 La. Ann. 667 (La. 1847). 
 364. Id. at 715. 
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defendant is a person interposed. One of them has judicially 
recognised the validity of the will, and the others are silent. 
The nullity is sued for on behalf of the fisc, exclusively for 
fiscal purposes, on the assumption that its capacity to 
maintain the action is the same as that of the heirs.365 
The Court again repeated itself in a 1902 case, Cox v. Lea’s Heirs, 
in which it had the following to say: 
It follows, therefore, that a testament, void by reason of 
certain defects, may nevertheless exist, within the 
contemplation of law, and that such defects are forgiven by 
the law, and, by operation of the law, are presumed to be 
forgiven by those who might complain of them, unless their 
complaints are made within the time prescribed.366 
Even as recently as 1962, Louisiana courts, under the old law, 
continued the same kind of rationale: 
[A] complete absence of the reading of a nuncupative will by 
private act, necessary to its validity as is also true in the case 
of the nuncupative will by public act (LSA-C.C. arts. 1582 
and 1578), is a defect of form cured by the prescription of 
five years under Civil Code Article 3542.367 
Modern scholars maintain the same and state that “[w]here a 
testament is alleged to be null for failure to observe the formalities 
required by the Code in the confection thereof, the action must be 
brought timely, otherwise it will be barred by the prescription of five 
years of article 3497.”368 
Once again, it appears that there exists another instance of mixed 
nullity, which the law clearly classifies as absolute but which the 
jurisprudence and other code articles seem to make prescriptible 
within a five-year timeframe. This, however, would be an erroneous 
conclusion. In this instance, the nullity involved in a will defective for 
lack of form requirements is an absolute one and thus ought to 
properly be considered imprescriptible, a line of jurisprudence 
notwithstanding to the contrary. 
The above cases that interpret article 3497 to mean that a 
testament defective in form prescribes in five years misapply article 
3497, which deals not with “void” or “null” testaments but with 
                                                                                                             
 365. Id. 
 366. 35 So. 275, 276–77 (1902). 
 367. Succession of Centanni, 142 So. 2d 636, 638–39 (La. Ct. App. 1962). 
 368. CYNTHIA SAMUEL, KATHERINE S. SPAHT, RONALD J. SCALISE JR. & 
MELISSA T. LONEGRASS, SUCCESSIONS, DONATIONS, AND TRUSTS: CASES AND 
READINGS 506 (2010). 
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“voidable” or “annullable” testaments. After all, the article states 
that “[a]n action for annulment of a testament” prescribes in five 
years.369 In other words, article 3497 applies only to those issues 
that are grounds for “voidability” of testaments, i.e., grounds for 
relative nullity, not those issues that are grounds for a testament 
being “void,” i.e., absolutely null. For example, incapacity, fraud, 
duress, and undue influence are all grounds for annulling a testament 
and thus examples of relative nullities.370 Article 2031 gives 
examples of grounds for the relative nullity of contracts: “when a 
party lacked capacity or did not give free consent.”371 These would 
be instances in which the law would create the nullity of a contract 
or will to protect a party (i.e., the testator), and thus only the testator 
(or his or her representative) could invoke the nullity. It would 
clearly be one of the grounds that would prescribe in five years 
under article 3497. To read article 3497 as a basis for subjecting a 
“null” will to a five-year prescriptive period is to continue a 200-
year-old mistake. In short, this instance, despite jurisprudential 
confusion, is not a proper example of a mixed nullity. 
In conclusion, although jurisprudential confusion abounds as to 
the classification and treatment of nullities, the dichotomous 
division between absolute and relative nullities is insufficiently 
sensitive to the various gradations of nullity that exist. The category 
of mixed nullities is suggested not only for classification purposes 
but also to give recognition to those nullities whose effects can 
neither be cabined in the absolute or relative groups. A proper mixed 
nullity combines the effects of both. 
CONCLUSION 
This modest contribution attempts to survey the existing legal 
landscape on the law of nullity by examining its history and the 
current state of the law. Moreover, using insights from foreign 
contemporary civil law scholarship, it attempts to provide a more 
accurate schematic than has existed for the understanding of the law 
of nullity in the Louisiana Civil Code. 
This Article is certainly not an exhaustive or comprehensive 
catalogue of all of the types of nullity that exist. Indeed, such a task 
would be impossible as the types of nonexistent acts, by themselves, 
are infinite. Rather this Article uses examples from all major 
substantive areas of the civil law (e.g., family law, property, 
obligations, matrimonial regimes, successions) to demonstrate the 
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inadequacy of the current theory and to provide a new schematic for 
understanding the current law. It is hoped that future contributions 
will further develop the ideas here and further explore their 
implications. 
